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Trademark Cosmopolitanism
Sonia K. Katyal*
The world of global trademarks can be characterized in terms of three
major shifts: first, a shift from national to global branding strategies;
second, a shift from national and regional systems to harmonized
international regimes governing trademark law; and third, a concurrent
shift from local to transnational social movements that challenge branding
and other corporate practices. This Article details how each of these areas
are deeply intertwined with one another, and also how the emergence of a
transnational trademark regime carries important implications for
freedom of expression worldwide.
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INTRODUCTION
In May of 2008, Nadia Plesner, a Danish art student, decided to do
something about the lingering crisis in Darfur. She designed a T-shirt
to raise money for the cause, depicting a starving Sudanese child
holding a Chihuahua in one hand and a Louis Vuitton bag in the other
— in a classic appropriation of a famous photograph depicting Paris
Hilton in a bikini. “I started this campaign because of the distorted
way the media prioritizes between big and small world news,” she
explained. “How can Paris Hilton make more front covers than the
genocide in Darfur?”1 Shortly thereafter, she was served with a harshly
written letter from the Intellectual Property Director for Louis Vuitton
(“LVMH”) that read, in part:
Although we applaud your efforts to raise awareness and funds
to help Darfur, a most worthy cause, we cannot help noticing
that the design . . . includes the reproduction of a bag
infringing on Louis Vuitton’s Intellectual Property Rights, in
particular the Louis Vuitton Monogram Multicolore
Trademark to which it is confusingly similar. We are surprised
of such a promotion of a counterfeit bag.
LVMH did not mince its words. The letter goes on to request that
Plesner discontinue distributing the shirt immediately.2
Plesner eventually replied, explaining to LVMH’s lawyer that she did
not use an exact replica of the bag, but rather meant for her depiction
to simply evoke designer bags in general.3 Nevertheless, LVMH
decided to file suit against her, threatening thousands of dollars in
damages.4 Shortly thereafter, the news quickly began to travel
1
Ernesto, Louis Vuitton Sues Darfur Fundraiser for Copyright Infringement,
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 25, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/louis-vuitton-sues-darfurfundraiser-for-copyright-infringement-080425 (quoting Nadia Plesner); see also
Jeremiah Owyang, Louis Vuitton Gets Brand-Jacked, Collateral Damage in Anti-Genocide
Campaign, WEB-STRATEGIST BLOG (May 4, 2008), http://www.web-strategist.com/
blog/2008/05/04/louis-vuitton-gets-brand-jacked-victimized-in-anti-genocide-campaigntough-spot-to-be-in (quoting Nadia Plesner) (“I felt horrified by the fact that even with
the genocide and other ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Paris Hilton was the one getting all
the attention.”).
2
Letter from Nathalie Moullé-Berteaux, Intellectual Property Director, Louis
Vuitton Malletier, to Nadia Plesner (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.clancco.
com/LouisVuittonLetter.pdf.
3
See Ernesto, supra note 1 (“Sometimes recognizable objects are needed to
express deeper meanings, and in their new form they become more than the objects
themselves, they become art,” Plesner explained, noting that she planned to “stand by
my freedom of expression — artistic and/or otherwise,” and continue distribution).
4
LVMH demanded $7,500 for each day she continued to sell the product,
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worldwide. Speaking to New York Magazine, Plesner argued that “[i]f I
was making bags and copying the design, I would understand the
problem,” but since she was caricaturing it instead in a picture, she
considered it part and parcel of her artistic freedom.5 Roughly six
months later, and after a major maelstrom in the media, the case
finally settled for an undisclosed amount, and Plesner no longer
distributes the shirt as a result.
The resolution of the case might have ended the standoff between
LVMH and Plesner, but only for the moment. Interestingly, a year or
so after the settlement, Plesner decided to reuse the very same image
in a large piece of visual art called Darfurnica, a piece modeled after
Picasso’s Guernica (a famous 1937 piece protesting the bombing of the
town with the same name). Plesner juxtaposed the image with a
variety of global brands, political symbols, and other elements from
high fashion. Plesner explained that she decided to name the painting
after Picasso’ famous work after she discovered that Guernica was
shrouded in blue cloth during a United Nations press conference on
the war in Iraq in 2003. For her, Guernica represented the power of
visual art to make connections between current political events and
issues of social justice.6
Plesner’s own work draws obvious parallels between the power of
political symbols, fashion symbols, and corporate symbols, noting how
each one occupies a tremendous amount of prominence in our visual
culture. Indeed, there is a triadic convergence of function between all
three categories of symbols, because each type can personify both the
brand creator as well as the audience that consumes them. Each of
these audiences — whether consumers of luxury goods, political
actors, or artist/activists like Nadia Plesner — oppositional or
otherwise, all integrate and respond to particular brands as part of
their process of self-expression.

another $7,500 for each day she posted its cease-and-desist letter on her site, another
$7,500 per day for each time she used the name “Louis Vuitton” on her website
(totaling over $20,000 per day), and finally, another $15,000 to cover their legal and
related expenses relating to the suit. See id.
5
See The Cut, Art Student Nadia Plesner’s Giant Louis Vuitton Copyright Suit, N.Y.
MAG. (May 6, 2008), http://nymag.com/daily/fashion/2008/05/art_student_nadia_
pelsners_gia.html.
6
See Nadia Plesner, Darfurnica Day 18 (July 27, 2009), http://www.nadiaplesner.
com/the-making-of-darfurnica (“It is amazing that an art work can be considered so
powerful, that it has to be covered up while governments present their plans. It only
proves that artists around the world must continue to work with the harsh issues to
influence the people with power and to start important debates.”).
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Further, as this story demonstrates, the relationships between
luxury brands, artistic expression, and global politics are constantly
shifting and in flux. The transnational nature of social movements and
global branding strategies have evoked significant questions about the
proper role of intellectual property law, sovereignty, and speech
within each sphere. Whereas earlier discussions of international social
justice issues (like the crisis in Darfur) might have been restricted to
human rights law or other forms of public international law, today’s
movements now unfold within the structures of the increasing
globalization of intellectual property law, as well. In other words,
private law — or specifically, trademark law — is now emerging to
play a role in international social justice disputes alongside these
longstanding public law approaches.
We have long been aware of the magnetic pull of global brands
across the world. But what is also remarkable is how powerful that
pull has become, even to those who oppose their prominence. As
Plesner’s case demonstrates, global luxury brands have become not
just the lingua franca of transnational consumption, but also of the
antibranding activists who resist it. Particularly when luxury brands
acquire a level of global prominence in public culture, as LVMH has
done, it is inevitable that its iconic imagery becomes even more
susceptible to recoding and commentary. The more LVMH has
invested in its brand, making it more and more ubiquitous in
consumer culture, it becomes more and more vulnerable as a result,
leading many individuals to use their brands and logos as a means of
expressing their own identity or as a vehicle for commenting on
consumerism, luxury, or branding in general. As a result, LVMH’s logo
is not just a logo; precisely because of its ubiquity, it now stands for
something else — luxury, elite excess, celebrity culture, and the like.
As Plesner’s case demonstrates, activists may seek to recode a brand
for purposes that have little to do with LVMH’s brand specifically. Yet
in each of these cases, property principles and freedom of speech
collide, with luxury brands as the backdrop, producing an impasse
with variable and unpredictable results.
Clearly, unauthorized uses pose serious legal and ethical questions
for global brand owners. Today, LVMH is one of the world’s most
valuable global brands.7 Like many luxury brands, LVMH, when faced
7
See MILLWARD BROWN, BRANDZ TOP 100 MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS 2013, at
25 (2013), available at http://www.millwardbrown.com/brandz/2013/Top100/Docs/
2013_BrandZ_Top100_Report.pdf; see also Andrew Roberts, Louis Vuitton Tops
Hermes as World’s Most Valuable Luxury Brand, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2012, 4:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-21/louis-vuitton-tops-hermes-as-world-s-
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with examples of unauthorized use, has a choice to make: it can either
tolerate alternative commentary, or it can choose to threaten litigation
over the unauthorized use of its trademarks. Either choice carries
consequences, both positive and negative, but each decision that
LVMH faces underscores how much our world has changed in the last
several decades regarding the rise and prominence of global branding.
Today, there are a multitude of what I call transnational brands:
brands that began with national origins, but which have become global
icons in the process.8
The rise of transnational brands brings with it an attendant series of
legal shifts in trademark law. Long considered the stepchild of
intellectual property law, today, trademark law has morphed into a
powerful global legal phenomenon, revealing a foundational shift from
national and regional systems to harmonized international regimes
governing trademark law. A unitary system of trademark registration
is emerging. However, even if a system of harmonized registration
becomes the new normal, territorial systems of trademark enforcement
— not to mention constitutional protections for freedom of expression
— vary widely. Here, age-old questions regarding sovereignty, human
rights, and artistic freedom have also begun to play a role in modern
trademark disputes, both domestically and internationally. Yet as the
Plesner case clearly demonstrates, as brands become global,
transnational entities, they also engender modes of resistance from a
number of different social movements. These movements, it seems, are
just as transnational as the global branding strategies that are often
their targets, demonstrating how questions of freedom of expression
emerge alongside the circulation of transnational brands.
This Article details how each of these areas are deeply intertwined
with one another, and how they demonstrate the emergence of a broad
phenomenon that I call trademark cosmopolitanism, which carries
important implications for freedom of expression worldwide. In this
Article, I refer to the phenomenon of trademark cosmopolitanism to
broadly sketch out four trajectories of transnational activities, and
their relationships to the various entities that play key roles in the
global branding enterprise — namely, the consumer, the corporation,

most-valuable-luxury-brand.html (stating Louis Vuitton remained the world’s most
valuable luxury brand for the seventh consecutive year).
8
For example, brands such as Nike, Apple, Ralph Lauren, and Honda started off
nationally before becoming global icons. See generally Mark K. Smith & Michele Erina
Doyle, Globalization: Theory and Experience, INFED, http://infed.org/mobi/globalizationtheory-and-experience/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (arguing that the growth and
globalization of multinational corporations is intertwined with branding power).
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the politician, and the activist. The first set of activities involves what I
call consumptive cosmopolitanism, and that refers to the purchasing
and shopping practices of the global consumer and the ways in which
these practices reflect a kind of globalized consciousness. The second
set of activities, which are closely related to the first set, involves the
emergence of a corporately-oriented cosmopolitanism that stems from
the global corporate social responsibility movement. The third kind of
activity, which reflects a more macroeconomic set of considerations,
involves the emergence of an institutionalized form of
cosmopolitanism, which refers to the variety of government and
nongovernment entities that have emerged to facilitate the creation,
enforcement, and protection of transnational brands. The final set of
transnational activities, however, typify a more politicized form of
trademark cosmopolitanism that focuses on challenging, rather than
consuming, the power of branding and multinational corporations.
All of these trajectories, I would argue, demonstrate broad and
varied facets of a phenomenon I call trademark cosmopolitanism —
underscoring the globalization of trademark law. This Article has three
sections. In Part I, I describe the first three trajectories of trademark
cosmopolitanism, and discuss the emergence of brands as global,
transnational figures of both speech, property, and increasingly,
corporate ethics. In Part II, I turn to the last trajectory and discuss
how the rise of trademark cosmopolitanism also relates to the global
antibranding movement, typified by the Plesner example. The
interplay between the global brand, the global antibrand, and the
language of ethics, cosmopolitanism, and corporate social
responsibility, with all of the legal differences associated with
sovereignty and speech, I would suggest, is one of the paramount
issues for trademark scholars in the future.
I.

THE RISE OF TRADEMARK COSMOPOLITANISM

In 1992, Jeremy Waldron published an article, Minority Cultures and
the Cosmopolitan Alternative, which described the emergence of
individuals who prefer that their cultural identities not be tied
specifically to a set of rigidly defined borders.9 Two years later, Martha
Nussbaum published a groundbreaking essay, Patriotism and
Cosmopolitanism, where she argued in favor of a kind of moral
9
See, Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 751, 754 (1991–1992) (developing the idea of “cosmopolitan”
individuals who do not self-identify based upon their location, ancestry, citizenship,
or language).
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universalism and the need for a cosmopolitan education that
recognized that central features of human personhood transcended
national boundaries.10 At the same time, however, she also embraced a
more robust notion of empathy. “By looking at ourselves in the lens of
the other,” she wrote, “we come to see what in our practices is local
and non-necessary, what more broadly or deeply shared.”11
Those words were written almost twenty years ago, where
Nussbaum described cosmopolitanism’s roots as linked to Diogenes,
the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher, who once proclaimed himself as
“a citizen of the world,” in response to a question about his geographic
origin.12 In a sense, as Nussbaum explained, Diogenes meant that he
eschewed a sense of identity that was defined solely by his local
origins and memberships, that instead, his identity was defined by
more universal aspirations. Much of this early view was later
developed by the Stoics, who viewed everyone as belonging to a world
community of humankind that was joined by basic ethical values and
principles, like justice, dignity, and respect.13 As Nussbaum observed,
through these globalized lenses, “[w]e recognize moral obligations to
the rest of the world that are real, and that otherwise would go
unrecognized.”14 At the same time, however, Nussbaum did not totally

10
See Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1, 1994),
http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism [hereinafter
Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism] (arguing that moral ideals of justice and equality are
better accomplished by a primary allegiance “to the community of human beings in the
entire world” than by a goal of national unity); see also COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 2 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) [hereinafter
COSMOPOLITICS]; DEREK HEATER, WORLD CITIZENSHIP: COSMOPOLITAN THINKING AND ITS
OPPONENTS 54 (Bloomsbury Academic 2004); Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan
Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 623 (1997); David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the
Banality of Geographical Evils, 12 PUB. CULTURE 529, 529-30 (2000); Martha Nussbaum,
Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 1-4 (1997) [hereinafter Kant and Stoic
Cosmopolitanism]. See generally DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM
THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995) (discussing Kant’s
interpretation of Democratic Cosmopolitanism); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM ET AL., FOR LOVE
OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 21-29 (J. Cohen ed., 1996) (providing
multisided discussions of the interaction between patriotism and cosmopolitanism);
Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitan, 104 ETHICS 516 (1994) (arguing the possibility
and ease of being both a citizen of a particular nation and a citizen of the world at once).
11
Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10.
12
See Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10, at 5.
13
Id. at 7-12.
14
See, e.g., Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10 (“If we
really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain
inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception
requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.”).
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eschew the pull of localized loyalties; she notes that even within this
approach, there was still room for patriotism, for localized
attachments and identities formed from a specific geographic origin.15
Similar observations have been made by Stuart Hall,16 anthropologist
Craig Calhoun,17 and others, all of whom embrace the notion of an
emergent global citizenry, a kind of transnational consciousness that
spanned borders and cultures and celebrated openness and
solidarity.18 Many have described cosmopolitanism as having
essentially two strands — one about culture and the self, and another
about justice — rejecting a kind of relativism that strict nationalism
might embrace.19 Others describe it along the lines of a political or
15
See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1032 (2007)
(asserting Nussbaum insisted on a “cosmopolitanism with room for local, ‘patriotic’
attachments”). Similarly, Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his book on cosmopolitanism,
also applauds a view that focuses on ethical obligations to others, one that also
embraces a highly robust view of autonomy, but also espouses a similar kind of
partiality — what Appiah calls “rooted cosmopolitanism” — the idea that one can be
partial to one’s ethical community. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM:
ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS 213, 223-32 (2007); Appiah, supra note 10, at 618;
see also Feldman, supra, at 1043 (discussing both Nussbaum and Appiah).
16
See Stuart Hall, Political Belonging in a World of Multiple Identities, in
CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE 25, 26 (Steven
Vertovec & Robin Cohen eds., 2002) (defining cosmopolitanism as “the ability to
stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community”); see
also SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 35, 40 (2005).
17
See Craig Calhoun, The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a
Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM:
THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 86, 102-09 (linking
cosmopolitanism to the spread of democracy); see also TARROW, supra note 16, at 40.
18
Des Gasper, Cosmopolitan Presumptions? On Martha Nussbaum and Her
Commentators, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 1227, 1230 (2006).
19
See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 49
(1992) (distinguishing between legal and moral cosmopolitanism); Samuel Scheffler,
Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, 11 UTILITAS 255 (1999) (outlining two views of
cosmopolitanism); see also David A. Hollinger, Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The
New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way, 8 CONSTELLATIONS 236, 236-38 (2002)
[hereinafter Not Universalists]. See generally SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER
COSMOPOLITANISM (Robert Post ed., 2006) (noting a transition from international to
cosmopolitan formations of justice); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS,
RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS (2004) (examining the incorporation of aliens, immigrants,
and refugees in light of Kantian cosmopolitanism); PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT’S
COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997)
(examining a tension between Kantian cosmopolitanism and nationalism that has
remained constant throughout the last 200 years); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING
RAWLS (1989) (asserting that Rawl’s critics fail to distinguish between morality and
justice); THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF COSMOPOLITANISM (Gillian Brock & Harry
Brighouse eds., 2005) (containing works by political theorists in defense of positive
cosmopolitanism as opposed to rigid support for national boundaries); KOK-CHOR
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institutional formulation — focusing on the emergence of globalized
institutions.20
Of course, much ink can be spilled about the importance of
cosmopolitanism on political and legal theory. For the purposes of this
Article, however, I want to briefly sketch out some of the ways in
which dominant approaches to the study of both cosmopolitanism and
transnationalism reveal new ways of situating our increasingly
globalized systems of trademark regulation, and the ancillary ethical
and moral questions that inevitably accompany this growth.
On a primary level, I would argue that Nussbaum and the current
scholarship on cosmopolitanism have much to offer intellectual
property scholars, many of whom are grounded in territorial
frameworks that often fail to reckon with the erosion of sovereignty,
the rise of global branding, and the ancillary rise of trademark
harmonization in our current legal context. Currently, the field of
trademark doctrine often remains closely tied to principles of
territoriality and localized principles, despite the widespread embrace
of transnational forces.21 As a result, the two forces often collide — a
TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM
(CONTEMP. POL. THEORY, Ian Shapiro ed., 2004) (suggesting cosmopolitan impartiality
to nationality and citizenship applies to the distribution of justice while
accommodating an individual’s independent recognition of nationality); Brian Barry,
Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 12 (Ian Shapiro &
Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999) (attacking Statism as a narrow theory); Charles R. Beitz,
Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 591-600 (1983)
(explaining the continued influence of nationalism after cosmopolitanism has taken
root); Robert Fine & Robin Cohen, Four Cosmopolitanism Moments, in CONCEIVING
COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 137, 137
(suggesting that cosmopolitanism is not a total anecdote to “nationalism, racism,
ethnic conflict, and religious fundamentalism”).
20
See Gasper, supra note 18, at 1229; see, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND
BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY (2005) (examining political philosophy’s
interaction with global politics and questioning which political philosophy should
govern on a global level); GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE
MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran
Cronin eds., 2002) (providing essays considering international institutional responses
to global crises); see also GARRETT WALLACE BROWN, GROUNDING COSMOPOLITANISM:
FROM KANT TO THE IDEA OF A COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION 11-14 (2009); LUIS CABRERA,
POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN CASE FOR THE WORLD STATE 1
(2004); DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITANISM: IDEALS, REALITIES AND DEFECTS 93-115 (2010);
CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 21-107 (1999); DARREL
MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE 7-28 (2002).
21
For more views on this phenomenon, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks
and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV 885,
887 (2004) (critiquing the principle of territoriality); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
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trademark system grounded in territoriality and the emergence of
harmonized systems of branding, marketing, and registration.
Admittedly, given how broad the field of cosmopolitanism has
become, and its vast history, it can mean a variety of things —
everything from an attitude or a value, to a kind of global governance,
to a set of views on social structures and beyond.22 Yet trademarks,
and global brands, are often a central vehicle by which these general
approaches to cosmopolitanism specifically and symbolically unfold,
and often the terrain under which conflicts over globalization and
localization take place. As a result, trademark cosmopolitanism, one
might argue, is thus inextricably linked to global flows of content, and
as content and brands circulate transnationally, so do the legal
principles of intellectual property that underpin them. The same is
also true for the social and political movements that have also emerged
surrounding the rise of global brands. Even the forces that oppose
globalization and the rise of multinational corporations, I would
argue, reflect a kind of cosmopolitan ethic that is worth further
analysis and study.23 This phenomenon also includes a wide array of
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Regime Shifting] (exploring the
relationship between TRIPS and intellectual property); Ruth L. Okediji, The
International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country
Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315
(2003) (arguing that the dominant narratives of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia support,
rather than question, current international intellectual property law); Peter K. Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 833 (2007) (arguing that
heightened protection of intellectual property rights has adverse effects on developing
and impoverished countries); Robert Stoll, Statement at United States House of
Representatives: Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Economy: Current
Trends and Future Challenges (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
news/speeches/2009/2009Dec9.jsp (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (discussing the
emergence of international intellectual property law in relation to U.S. policy); and
Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 227 (1996) (stating “that uniform protection of intellectual
property rights around the world would promote the expansion of international trade,
global economic growth, and job creation”).
22
See Ian Woodward et al., Attitudes Towards Globalization and Cosmopolitanism:
Cultural Diversity, Personal Consumption and the National Economy, 59 BRIT. J. SOC.
207, 208 (2008) (making this observation).
23
Several legal scholars have also studied similar themes with respect to the
globalization of intellectual property. See, e.g., LOUISE BERNIER, JUSTICE IN GENETICS:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE
(Edward Elgar ed., 2010) (discussing cosmopolitization in relation to distribution of
intellectual property as health resources); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293,
1341-42 (1996) (discussing the difficulties of conflicting legal regimes and
globalization in relation to intellectual property law); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a
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third parties who are, directly or indirectly, broadly implicated in the
process of global branding, either because they support the process,
like consumers, or because they oppose it, like anti-globalization
activists. All of these elements encompass descriptive and normative
aspects to their approaches, and they also underwrite some of the most
important challenges for trademark law in the future.
A. From National Brand to Global Icon: Consumptive Cosmopolitanism
In 1983, in a groundbreaking article for the Harvard Business
Review, Professor Theodore Levitt claimed that a global market for
standardized, uniform products and services had emerged.24 To
maximize the opportunities that this market presented, Levitt
recommended selling standardized products in a wide variety of
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global
Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005) (discussing problems of choice-of-law and the
recognition of judgments in relation to intellectual property); Margaret Chon, Law
Professor as Artist: Themes and Variations in Keith Aoki’s Intellectual Property
Scholarship, 90 OR. L. REV. 1251 (2012) (discussing the work of Keith Aoki); Shubha
Ghosh, Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal Criminal Trade Secret Law, 9 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 24 (2009) (focusing on the intersection between
boundaries in intellectual property law and those in immigration policy); Amy
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 820 (2008) (discussing the recent countermobilization
against strong international property law); Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual
Property in the Globalization Epoch: The Integration of Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135 (2004) (examining the perceived conflict between the
centrifugal focus of the attempt to integrate customary regimes for knowledge
protection into the IP discourse, and the phenomenon of globalization as symbolized
by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement);
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century: Need for
Stronger “Democratic Ownership” and Cosmopolitan Reforms, 31 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 9,
17 (2011) (discussing the relation between international economic law and human
rights law); Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in International Intellectual
Property Law, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1021 (2007) (questioning whether the infusion of
human rights concepts and rhetoric will serve, on balance, to make international IP
rights more socially just); Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access:
Intellectual Property and the Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195
(2010) (analyzing the community that the Access Movements create through their
critiques and proposals concerning the division of property and power in our
networked world).
24
See Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June
1983, at 92, 92-102; see also Susan P. Douglas et al., Integrating Branding Strategy
Across Markets: Building International Brand Architecture, 9 J. INT’L MARKETING 97, 101
(2001); Douglas B. Holt et al., How Global Brands Compete, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.
2004, at 68, 69 [hereinafter Global Brands]; John Ruff, The Globalization of a Food
Processor, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 727, 727 (1996) (discussing the globalization of the
Kraft brand).
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geographic contexts and markets. Commenting on Levitt’s article,
years later, brand scholars Douglas Holt and others explained that
even though Levitt did not explicitly discuss branding, his ideas were
interpreted to suggest the need for greater standardization and
uniformity — not just among products, but among brand identities —
giving rise to the growth of the global branding phenomenon.25
Thirty years after Levitt’s article was published, we see dramatic
shifts in the standardization of both goods and of trademarks globally.
Corporations, just like individuals, have adopted a global outlook and
approach in many aspects of their day-to-day practices regarding
brand management. Today, international branding comprises much
more than just a selection of brand names — remember the famous
Chevy Nova story, where “No Va” translated into “no go” in Spanish
— but it is also about auditory, visual, emotional brand design.26 The
process of global branding, for example, has been described to
encompass everything from companies that use an identical marketing
strategy across countries to others which utilize a similar brand with
some variations in different markets.27 Other definitions of global
25
See Colin Grant, Theodore Levitt’s Marketing Myopia, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 397, 399
(1999) (“While the specific tone of Levitt’s tactic might not prove particularly effective
today, the level at which it aims, that of our most basic dreams and desires, remain
crucial for contemporary advertising.”); Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69;
see also Jeryl Whitelock & Carole Pimblett, The Standardisation Debate in International
Marketing, 10 J. GLOBAL MARKETING 45, 45-46 (1997); Yoram Wind, The Myth of
Globalization, 3 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 23, 23 (1986); Shaoming Zou & S. Tamer
Cavusgil, The GMS: A Broad Conceptualization of Global Marketing Strategy and Its
Effect on Firm Performance, 66 J. MARKETING, Oct. 2002, at 40, 41 (citing Levitt’s
standardization perspective as “perhaps the most influential view” on global
marketing strategy).
26
See Bernd Schmitt, From the Special Issue Editor, 10 J. INT’L MARKETING, SPECIAL
ISSUE ON GLOBAL BRANDING, Summer 2002, at 2, 2-3 (containing excellent empirical
papers on global trademarks and brands).
27
See, e.g., David A. Aaker & Erich Joachimsthaler, The Lure of Global Branding,
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 137 (discussing the principles that successful global
branding employs); Dana L. Alden et al., Brand Positioning Through Advertising in Asia,
North America, and Europe: The Role of Global Consumer Culture, 63 J. MARKETING, Jan.
1999, at 75 (examining “the emergence of brand positioning strategies in advertising that
parallel the growth of the global marketplace”); Douglas et al., supra note 24 (discussing
the “implications for the design and management of the firm’s international brand
architecture”); Andy Pike, Geographies of Brands and Branding, 33 PROGRESS HUM.
GEOGRAPHY 619, 619 (2009) (“seek[ing] to elucidate the geographies of brands and
branding through interpreting their geographical entanglements.”); Larry Roellig,
Designing Global Brands: Critical Lessons, 12 DESIGN MGMT. J. 40 (2001) (highlighting “the
numerous strategic and tactical considerations to keep in mind when producing a global
brand expression”); Martin S. Roth, The Effects of Culture and Socioeconomics on the
Performance of Global Brand Image Strategies, 32 J. MARKETING RES. 163 (1995) (studying

888

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:875

branding focus instead on the building of brand equity internationally,
and still others focus on the harmonization of an international brand
and marketing architecture.28
In turn, just as brands now reflect a kind of global consciousness
and design, globalization has also produced a generation of
cosmopolitanist consumers.29 This emerging culture is not tied to a
singular global brand, or a culture of homogeneity, but a global
culture instead — enabling consumers to “see themselves in relation
to other cultures as well as their own.”30 This is not to suggest that
consumers share the same tastes, but rather, that they participate in a
shared conversation that often centers around the presence and
participation of global brands. “Like entertainment stars, sports
celebrities and politicians,” Douglas Holt writes, “global brands have
become a lingua franca for consumers all over the world.”31 Anecdotal
evidence further demonstrates these conclusions — “Global brands
make us feel like citizens of the world, and . . . they somehow give us
an identity,” one Argentinian consumer observed.32
Reading some of the vast literature on global branding, one is struck
by the immediate similarity of its descriptive and normative insights to

the differing cultural effects on brand performance); Sandeep Saxena, Challenges and
Strategies of Global Branding in Indian Market, IOSR J. BUS. & MGMT., Sept.–Oct. 2012, at
38 (discussing the six challenges (6E’s) and the strategies of global marketing); Kasia
Moreno, What’s Easier: To Make a Billion Dollars, Build a Global Company or Create a
Global Brand?, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesinsights/2013/04/09/whats-easier-to-make-a-billion-dollars-build-a-global-companyor-create-a-global-brand/ (discussing how innovation in a given country affects marketing
strategy); Schumpeter, Emerging-Market Companies are Trying to Build Global Brands,
ECONOMIST (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559894/ (discussing the
hardships associated with global branding).
28
See Pike, supra note 27, at 626-27 (citing sources).
29
See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 75; Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, The Psychology of
Globalization, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 774, 774 (2002); Rejeev Batra et al., Effects of
Brand Local and Nonlocal Origin on Consumer Attitudes in Developing Countries, 9 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 83, 83 (2000); Ernest Dichter, The World Customer, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jul.Aug. 1962, at 113, 113; France Leclerc et al., Foreign Branding and Its Effects
on Product Perceptions and Attitude, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 263, 268 (1994); Yuliya
Strizhakova et al., Branded Products as a Passport to Global Citizenship: Perspectives
from Developed and Developing Countries, 16 J. INT’L MARKETING, Dec. 2008, at 57, 57;
see, e.g., GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY (Westby et al. eds., 2004)
(discussing how globalization has affected different social institutions, including
consumers).
30
Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 70.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 71. Another consumer from New Zealand echoed similarly, “Global
brands make you feel part of something bigger and give you a sense of belonging.” Id.
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the literature on cosmopolitanism. Some authors, for example, tend to
focus on the notion of cosmopolitanism as a fundamental set of
identities that involve a sense of “belonging . . . to the world as a
whole,” a kind of global citizenry that reflects transnational
perspectives.33 Other authors tend to describe cosmopolitanism in
terms of a set of identities, values, and attitudes that variously embrace
notions of diverse world perspectives, and a strong degree of openness
to others. This type of cultural competence embraces global diversity
in terms of food, music, self-presentation, and ethical world views.34
As the prior sentence suggests, part of the culture of
cosmopolitanism is deeply tied to consumer practices of consumption,
and it is also linked to visual brand culture as well. Our sense of the
world around us — our very language and ways of thinking and
framing our environments — are deeply inscribed and circumscribed
by the brands and advertising that inhabit our everyday world. Brands,
like cosmopolitanist approaches, have symbolic, emotional, and
cultural aspects. And as brands become more and more global in their
design and interpretative reach, it makes sense that our cosmopolitan
world view becomes reflected through patterns of consumption and
changes in consumer identity.35 Twenty years ago, global branding
33
See Nancy E. Cook, Canadian Development Workers, Transnational Encounters
and Cultures of Cosmopolitanism, 27 INT’L SOC. 3, 5-6 (2012) (suggesting three aspects
— one normative, one political, and one cultural); Woodward et al., supra note 22, at
209 (“[Cosmopolitanism is] an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward
divergent cultural experiences.” (quoting Ulf Hannerz, Cosmopolitans and Locals in
World Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY: A
THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY SPECIAL ISSUE 242-43 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990))).
Other, cultural approaches to cosmopolitanism, for example, center on increasing
tolerance for diversity and cultural competence, see Cook, supra, at 5. For example,
one author defines the cosmopolitan as possessing a “willingness to engage with the
other.” Id. at 6; see also Michele Lamont & Sada Aksartova, Ordinary
Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Racial Boundaries Among Working-Class Men,
19 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Aug. 2002, at 1, 2; Loren B. Landau & Iriann
Freemantle, Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and SelfExclusion in Johannesburg, 36 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 375, 380 (2010).
34
See Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 208.
35
See generally Russell Adams, Fragmentation and Segmentation: Marketing Global
Benefits, 10 INT’L BUS. ECON. RES. J. 59, 60 (2011) (discussing branding as building
global communities); Lee Jung-Wan & Simon Tai, Young Consumers’ Perceptions of
Multinational Firms and Their Acculturation Channels Towards Western Products in
Transition Economies, 1 INT’L J. EMERGING MARKETS 212 (2006) (documenting a young
generation’s view of multinational brands); Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp et al., How
Perceived Brand Globalness Creates Brand Value, 34 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 53 (2003)
(explaining how globalness effects brand purchase); Alladi Venkatesh & Suguna
Swamy, India as an Emerging Consumer Society: A Critical Perspective, in RESEARCH IN
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: CONSUMPTION IN MARKETIZING ECONOMIES (Clifford J. Shultz II et
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scholars argued that the less consumerized a market is, the more the
emphasis is on the utilitarian aspects of a brand, and its link to the
marketplace. Today, all of that has shifted in favor of advertising that
trends towards being more symbolic, and more emotional in order to
connect to the consumer. Trademarks, today, are less about
identifications of origin; instead, their earlier function has been
surpassed by their growing role as “messengers” that convey a broad
range of information to the public about the product, the company,
the people behind the company, and the attributes of each.36 As a
result, the trademark represents both a global visual receptacle and a
vehicle for all of the emotive and personality characteristics that
advertisers hope to associate with a particular brand.37 Obviously as
markets become globalized, brands — and individuals — do as well.38
More recently, although the rush towards global branding has
waned at different points, it has also given rise to a greater push
towards localized customization to suit consumer tastes, a “glocal”
strategy, as some have called it.39 For example, Kraft general foods
markets Philadelphia cream cheese globally, but it differs its approach
— so in the United States we are encouraged to eat it on bagels, but in
Spain, they sell a salmon-flavored version; Germany gets a pearflavored version; Italy, a tuna version. McDonalds does something
similar — you can get wine with your burger in France, or beer in
Germany, or an Indian potato burger in India.40 All of this, of course,
depends on the interplay between satisfying and constructing
consumer preferences, depending upon the context.41

al. eds., 7th ed. 1994) (arguing that consumers in developing nations have a
preference for global brands because consuming them gives them a sense that they are
a part of a global community).
36
Matthew James Elsmore, The Implications of Intellectual Property Law for the
Auditing and Protection of National and International Brands: Part III. Brands in Europe,
15 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 209, 210 (2000).
37
See Ming Hsieh, Identifying Brand Image Dimensionality and Measuring the
Degree of Brand Globalization: A Cross National Study, 10 J. INT’L MARKETING, SPECIAL
ISSUE ON GLOBAL BRANDING, Summer 2002, at 46, 59.
38
See Julio Cerviño & Jose Maria Cubillo, A Resource Based Perspective on Global
Branding: An Analysis of Trademark Registration Data, 21 INT’L J. MGMT. 451, 460
(2004).
39
Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69.
40
See Elsmore, supra note 36, at 224-25.
41
For example, with respect to goods like laundry detergent — some markets
prefer “green” detergents and are willing to pay a premium, others care less about
these issues, but face a wide diversity in machines, water temperature, and
preferences, requiring greater creativity in marketing. See id.
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Today, Coca-Cola soft drinks and Marlboro cigarettes are the top
two global brands. Soft drinks, tobacco, pet foods, and snack foods are
other areas with the greatest global brand presence.42 Not only are
global branding strategies economical from an efficiency perspective,
because they enable one company to use one advertising agency for its
global reach, but they also help centralize the messaging and
personality that surrounds a global brand.43 Further, not only do they
enable the creation of a global brand identity, but they are also
thought to offer a number of benefits to the consumer, namely
credibility, authority, value, and power, and the feeling of belonging to
a global community.44 Some empirical evidence has shown, for
example, that people tend to endorse the idea that globalization will
enhance their opportunities to consume products from around the
world, and relatedly, that sampling from and learning about different
cultures is a widely appealing endeavor.45
However, cosmopolitanism is not an enterprise free from critique
and concern. Some scholars have critiqued cosmopolitanism for its
close relationship to notions of empire, capitalism, and western idioms
of thought, expressing concern that it facilitates “an improving
conversion of the local other into the western universal.”46 One must
be careful not to presume that both cosmopolitanism and globalization
are always connected — as one author points out, it is both
historically and empirically unwarranted to view globalization as a
precondition for cosmopolitanism.47 One can be globalized, but still
lacking the definitive consciousness that cosmopolitanism brings,
desiring insularity, nationalism, and parochialism.
Further, there remain substantial and quite valid concerns about the
impact of globalization on cultural and consumer diversity.48 Global

42

Dennis Pitta, Foundations for Building Share of Heart in Global Brands, 17 J.
PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 64, 66 (2008).
43
Aaker & Joachimsthaler, supra note 27, at 137.
44
See Hsieh, supra note 37, at 60-61.
45
Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 217 (showing 85–95% of respondents to a
survey endorse these views).
46
Cook, supra note 33, at 5 (citation omitted).
47
See Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 210.
48
See, e.g., RITZER, supra note 29 (discussing the affect of globalized corporate
structure on the international community); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (1991)
(exploring the relationship between the globalization of the financial industry and the
growth of global cities); SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988)
(discussing cultural changes in manufacturing nations, especially South-East Asia and
the Caribbean Basin, as well as changes in market locations such as California, New
York, and New Jersey).
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consumer culture has been described as “a cultural identity not
associated with a single country, but rather a larger group generally
recognized as international and transcending individual national
cultures.”49 There are, of course, distributional effects of these social
formations — one scholar writes that the “rise of global consumption
ideals, potentially makes the elite among Third World consumers into
cosmopolitans who are more concerned with how they compare to the
world’s privileged consumers than they are to compare themselves
locally.”50 Other anecdotal and theoretical treatments of this issue have
emphasized the increasing homogeneity of the global consumer, to the
point that localized cultures and tastes may play a secondary role to
the dominance of global brand identity. Even empirical studies have
suggested this to be the case.51 Other studies argue, as a variation, that
“increasing globalization has reduced the homogeneity of consumer
behaviors within countries, while increasing communalities among
consumers across countries.”52 Central to this process, nevertheless, is
the desire to own the “consumption symbols” or goods from countries
whose lifestyles are admired.53 Here, brands become a central part of
the sign of membership in a global cosmopolitan community, of
membership in a “transnational commerce culture.”54

49

See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 80.
Mark Cleveland, Michel Laroche & Nicolas Papadopoulos, Cosmopolitanism,
Consumer Ethnocentrism, and Materialism: An Eight-Country Study of Antecedents and
Outcomes, 17 J. INT’L MARKETING 116, 120 (2009) (quoting Russell Belk, Consumption
Patterns of the New Elite in Zimbabwe, 20 J. MACROMARKETING 204 (2000)); see also
Güliz Ger & Russell W. Belk, I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke: Consumptionscapes of
the “Less Affluent World,” 19 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 271, 272-73 (1996).
51
One study concludes that while localized behaviors still matter, “a global
consumer is beginning to emerge to some degree,” noting that mass communication
has the ability to “break down national identity.” Bruce Keillor, Michael D’Amico &
Veronica Horton, Global Consumer Tendencies, 18 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 1, 15-16
(2001).
52
Mark Cleveland & Michel Laroche, Acculturation to the Global Consumer
Culture: Scale Development and Research Paradigm, 60 J. BUS. RES. 249, 250 (2007)
(emphasis in original); cf. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495,
544-48 (2001) (making a similar argument with respect to culture and social
movements).
53
Cleveland & Laroche, supra note 52, at 253.
54
See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 77 (quoting Ulf Hannerz, Cosmopolitans and
Locals in World Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND
MODERNITY: A THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY SPECIAL ISSUE 242-43 (Mike Featherstone
ed., 1990)).
50
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B. The Rise of Corporate Cosmopolitanism
So far, I have outlined how a cosmopolitan world view has become
reflected in the process of global branding and transnational
consumption, both by corporations and also by individuals. But for
Nussbaum and others, cosmopolitanism is also deeply tied to a notion
of ethics, a concept of duty to other individuals. Here, too, trademark
law becomes intimately tied to the process of creating greater attention
to corporate social responsibility, particularly in the creation of global
brands.
As companies become more globalized, and multinational in
character, and the design and creation of brands have followed suit,
consumers have also followed this trend, focusing their attention on
the global business practices of the companies that they patronize.
While there is a vast literature on corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”) and its various forms, I want to sketch out, briefly here, some
of the complementarities between modern CSR approaches and the
phenomenon of trademark cosmopolitanism that I have described so
far.55
Although the term “corporate social responsibility” was coined by
economist Howard Bowen a decade after Nuremberg,56 its modern
formation tends to emphasize the need for corporations to consider
the social and ecological impact of their practices on humanity as a
whole, and without ceasing to remain a profit generating entity.57
While the field of CSR traditionally refers to the protection of human
rights, labor rights, the environment, and non-corrupt business
practices, among other considerations,58 it also connects deeply to
notions of trademark cosmopolitanism for a variety of reasons.
First, as the previous section suggested, the brand’s visuality often
becomes the central repository for all the ancillary conflicts that
surround a corporation — social, political, economic, etc. As a result,
in order to protect their brands from public reproach, most companies
55
For more information on CSR see Corporate Social Responsibility, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd.org/business/issues/sr.aspx (last visited Sept. 29,
2013); CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE, http://www.csrwire.com/ categories/23-CorporateSocial-Responsibility/press_releases (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); and Devin Thorpe,
Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility Will Move You to Act, FORBES
(May 18, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2013/05/18/whycsr-the-benefits-of-corporate-social-responsibility-will-move-you-to-act.
56
See Jonathan Bellish, Towards a More Realistic Vision of Corporate Social
Responsibility Through the Lens of the Lex Mercatoria, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 548,
558 (2012).
57
See id. at 560.
58
Id.
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now engage in proactive strategies that infuse the brand’s personality
with information about a company’s desirable business practices and
its commitment to social responsibility.59 Information about corporate
practices in each of these areas — human rights, labor, the
environment, etc. — deeply affects the way in which the brand is
viewed. Think, for example, of how companies like British Petroleum
have had to rebrand themselves after evidence of their ethical or
environmental practices came to light.60
Second, it also connects to consumers’ own cosmopolitanism,
reflected in their global buying practices. As consumers view
themselves as global citizens, they increasingly offer concern for the
manufacturing practices of the companies that they patronize. For
example, consider the maelstrom of media attention that focused on
Apple after evidence of its iPhone manufacturing practices came to
light.61 Third, and relatedly, the brand becomes the visual cue for the
information that the consumer possesses about a company’s labor
practices. That is why the relationship between a company’s brand
managers and activist antibranding movements can be so contentious
for trademark lawyers.62 By recoding brands in ways that highlight a
59

See Douglas B. Holt et al., How Model Behavior Brings Market Power: Consumers
Associate Global Brands with Good Quality But Also Hold Global Companies to Higher
Ethical Standards, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2004), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e4c539cf4a0-11d8-9911-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2fSAilHhN.
60
Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 984-85
(2011); Jennifer Sawayda & O.C. Ferrell, BP Gulf Coast Disaster and Recovery,
CENGAGE LEARNING 1, 1-4, http://cengagesites.com/academic/assets/sites/4004/BP_
1439042233_250174_WM.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2013); see also Rebranding
Blackwater: Your Brand Is Much More than Your Name & Logo, VISIBLE LOGIC INC. (May
21, 2009), http://www.visiblelogic.com/blog/2009/05/rebranding-blackwater-yourbrand-is-much-more-than-your-logo/ (discussing a company’s motivation to rebrand).
61
See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, Will Child Labour Claims Stop You Buying Apple?,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/
2010/mar/01/apple-ipod (discussing allegations that children manufactured Apple
products); Farhad Manjoo, Apple in China: The iPhone Maker Should Ditch Its Troubling
Labor Practices and Reinvent Gadget Manufacturing, HUFF. POST (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/apple-china-foxconn_n_1246693.html
(discussing the working conditions of Chinese employees producing Apple products);
Bill Ray, 40,000 Apple Fanbois Demand Ethical iPhone 5, REGISTER (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/01/ethical_iphone/ (discussing a petition
requesting better working conditions for employees who make Apple products);
Katherine Yau, Apple Product Sales at an All-Time High, Labor Practices at Dangerous
Low, GOLDEN GATE EXPRESS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.goldengatexpress.org/2012/
03/07/apple-products/ (discussing the need to refrain from buying Apple products as
long as there are poor working conditions in the factories).
62
See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676-78 (2003).
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company’s connection to environmental degradation, unfair labor
practices, or other issues of social justice, activists can further inform
the public and — literally — alter the semiotic significance of a
particular brand to the public. That is why branding often plays such a
powerful role in disputes about CSR.63
There are other, proactive branding strategies that further
underscore a commitment to CSR.64 One of the key ways in which
corporations address their CSR is through the marketplace —
including “rights-sensitive” branding strategies, codes of conduct,
voluntary submissions to auditing practices, and shareholder
pressure.65 “Rights-sensitive” branding involves the practice of offering
a particular selection of goods to consumers who are willing to pay a
premium for ethically sourced materials — like Starbucks’ “fair trade”
coffees, Chiquita’s “ethical banana” marketed in Europe, and the
Kimberly Process of reducing conflict diamonds in the marketplace.66
Other market-based solutions also have branding implications as well
— Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, and others have adopted private codes of
conduct that are often used to buttress their reputations on the global
branding platform.67
63
It also helps explain why the most prominent global brands often have the best
reputations for CSR. See, for example, Jacquelyn Smith, The Companies With the Best CSR
Reputations, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/
2012/12/10/the-companies-with-the-best-csr-reputations/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013), for a
discussion that Forbes’s ranking of the companies with the best corporate social
responsibility are also companies with the most prominent global brands. See Being a
Responsible Company, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility (last
visited Sept. 20, 2013) (stating “[a]s we have grown to now more than 18,000 stores in over
60 countries, so too has our commitment to corporate citizenship” and noting Starbucks’s
commitment to ethical sourcing); Corporate Responsibility Report: FY 10–11, NIKE, INC.,
http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/report/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); Microsoft 2012
Citizenship Report, MICROSOFT 62, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/
en-us/reporting/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (noting its commitment to global citizenship);
Sustainable Business Performance Summary: Striving for Better Performance, NIKE, INC.,
http://nikeinc.com/pages/responsibility (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (“As environmental,
social and economic challenges in our world proliferate, they demand our best performance.
We’re using the power of our brand, the energy and passion of our people and the scale of
our business to create meaningful change.”).
64
See Ellisha Nasruddin & Reevany Bustami, The Yin and Yang of CSR Ethical
Branding, 12 ASIAN ACAD. MGMT. J. 83, 83-85 (2007).
65
Bellish, supra note 56, at 567.
66
Id.
67
Some have argued that the “rights-sensitive” branding approach only affects a
small segment of consumers, those that are not price sensitive, but highly value
sensitive. Indeed, most of the companies that engage in fair trade and ethically
sourced practices tend to be premium brands, which suggests that consumers that
purchase these goods tend to be willing — and able — to pay a premium. Admittedly,
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Of course, that is not the only practical strategy of CSR visibility —
other companies, like Shell Nigeria, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum,
and Union Carbide also engage in rebranding and CSR-type behavior
after a major disaster, attempting to retain consumers by taking
measures to restore their reputation.68 Other companies engage in
voluntary codes of conduct — Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss, and other
companies employ inspectors who grade suppliers on labor standards
and attempt to ensure fairer practices.69 These practices are both
represented and reinforced by massive advertising campaigns that are
also infused with branding these companies’ social responsibility and
further informing the public of their activities. Here, the global brand
is actively linked to the culture and ethics of cosmopolitanism, albeit
indirectly, further underlining how trademarks provide the visual,
symbolic vehicle to communicate such information.
C. The Role of Institutionalized Cosmopolitanism
Of course, trademark cosmopolitanism would be deeply ineffective
if it were not for the way in which both legal and political systems
have adjusted to facilitate the production of global brands to suit
consumer preferences. Here, too, we can find key synergies with
traditional cosmopolitanist approaches, particularly those which focus
on the growth of institutional frameworks. For example, one of the
most prominent articulations of modern institutional cosmopolitanism
stems from Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the idea of membership
to the community of humanity as a whole.70 Kant developed this idea
in the context of a world federation that focused on cosmopolitanism
as a form of right, along with the growth of world trade and a global
public sphere.71 In more contemporary times, Jack Goldsmith, in his
these companies affect a smaller share of the consuming public, but they do provide
visibility to the importance of ethical corporate behavior, which in turn may affect the
proliferation of global branding practices and the political meanings the public
associates with them. Id. at 567-68.
68
Id. at 573.
69
Id. at 574.
70
Pheng Cheah, Cosmopolitanism, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 486, 487-89
(2006).
71
See id. at 487; see also G. PASCAL ZACHARY, THE GLOBAL ME: NEW COSMOPOLITANS
AND THE COMPETITIVE EDGE: PICKING GLOBALISM’S WINNERS AND LOSERS, at x-xiii (2000);
Timothy Brennan, At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now, in CONVERGENCES:
INVENTORIES OF THE PRESENT 148 (Edward W. Said ed., 1997); Pheng Cheah,
Introduction II: The Cosmopolitical — Today, in COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 10, at 2228; David A. Hollinger, Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and the United States, in
IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 92 (Noah M.J. Pickus ed., 1998);
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writing on cosmopolitanism, similarly writes of a recent turn to a
more institutionalized sense of cosmopolitanism — the idea that
duties attach to domestic institutions (e.g., national governments)
and, derivatively, to international institutions.72
These ideals also resonate in the complex world of international
intellectual property. In just the past few decades, we have seen a
massive rise in systems of intellectual property harmonization, along
with the simultaneous rise of global branding and trademarking
practices. While the two may or may not be causally related, they
suggest that the institutional growth of transnational entities to
regulate trademarks raises related questions regarding the aftereffects
of globalization on both legal and political systems. The Paris
Convention and TRIPS both obligate parties to create and provide
minimum standards of protection for trademarks, but this process has
been messy, costly, and deeply fraught with conflict for some nations,
particularly across the developing world.73
Yet as applied to trademarks, the institutional afterlife of
cosmopolitanism reveals a complex reordering of the notion of
national borders, one that is largely scripted by the transnational
Hollinger, Not Universalists, supra note 19, at 239 (distinguishing between
cosmopolitanism and pluralism); Samuel Scheffler, Cosmopolitanism, Justice &
Institutions, 127 DAEDALUS 68, 68 (2008); Yuri Slezkine, N. Ia. Marr and the National
Origins of Soviet Ethnogenetics, 55 SLAVIC REV. 826, 834 (1996).
72
Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1667, 1670 (2003); see also CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 144-55 (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 195, 196 (1994). Others also have written about the cosmopolitanist
elements in extraterritorial jurisdiction, which focuses on a broad concept of a legal
duty to others. See William F. Helmken, Legal Duty Beyond Borders: Value Pluralism
and the Possibility of Cosmopolitan Law, 4 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 151, 160
(2011).
73
See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2831-32 & n.80 (2006); Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS: An
Asymmetric Negotiation, 1993 Third World Econ. 9, 10; Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing A Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to
Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1188-89, 1201-04
(2009); Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 743-45, 768-72 (1996); Paul J. Heald, Mowing the
Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88
MINN. L. REV. 249, 297-99 (2003); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age:
Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441,
452 (2000); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
371, 375-76 (2006); Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries
into a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.iatp.org/files/What_It_Will_Take_to_Get_Developing_
Countries_.htm.
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circulation of global brands. Some brands, of course, begin as local
markets and then expand internationally, and others are actually
designed to be global at their outset. The emergence of transnational
systems — TRIPS, the Madrid system, and Europe’s Community
Trademark system, among others — shift the process of branding
from a national or local enterprise to one where companies must
imagine, at the moment of brand creation, how their brands will fare
on the worldwide stage. “At Novartis,” for example, one spokesperson
explains, “we only have global branding concepts. Our products are
introduced at the global scale.”74
Thus, just as global branding is now an integral part of any
multinational marketing enterprise, global trademark registration is an
essential part of the portfolio for any growing business. In Eastern
Europe, for example, companies had registered marks for over a
decade prior to the fall of communism in markets that had not even
opened yet.75 Empirical evidence has shown how trademarks have
dramatically risen in power, as companies have chosen to engage in far
more trademarking and branding activity than in prior years,
suggesting that trademarks comprise a much greater proportion of
countries’ GDP.76
The increase in trademarking activity — coupled with the rise of
global branding — has also spurred some significant international
changes. More and more companies are choosing to register
trademarks in other countries; WIPO has reported a significant
increase in nonresident applications for trademarks, mostly from
applicants who reside in higher income countries. Consider some
statistics: According to WIPO, the number of trademarks has
increased from 500,000 in 1985 to over two million in 2007.77 From
2009 to 2010, for example, the world saw a 21.4% increase in the

74
Roya Ghafele, Trademark Owner’s Perspective on the Madrid System: Practical
Experiences and Theoretical Underpinnings, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 160, 166
(2007).
75
Mitchell Smith, Trade Marks and the Protection of Cultural Integrity 8 (Working
Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395548.
76
The expanding economic role for trademarks in national economies is dramatic.
In Australia, for example, the number of marks per billion of dollars of GDP has
doubled, from 50 in the early 1990s to 100 in 2002. Joanne Loundes & Mark Rogers,
The Rise of Trade Marking in Australia in the 1990s 3 (Melb. Inst. of Applied Econ. and
Soc. Res. Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 8/03, 2003); see also Smith, supra note 75,
at 2.
77
Loundes & Rogers, supra note 76, at 6 (citing Statistics on Trademarks, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/marks/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013)).
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global registration of trademarks.78 2011, in turn, saw the highest
number of international trademark applications ever filed under
WIPO’s Madrid system, with filings from Russia, the EU, and the
United States in the lead for the most applications.79 Applications had
gone up almost 7% over the previous year, to a total of nearly 42,000
filed that year.80
Today, the Madrid Protocol remains the most powerful tool for
brand owners to register their marks in other countries.81 The Madrid
system is based on two treaties, the Madrid Agreement which is called
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks (“Madrid Agreement”), adopted in 1891, and the Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement, adopted in 1989 and in force since
78

Intellectual Property Filings Worldwide Rebound Strongly in 2010, WIPO 8,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/wipi/pdf/941_2011_highlights.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
79
See Record International Trademark Filings in 2011, WIPO (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0004.html.
80
See id.
81
For articles on the Madrid Protocol, see generally Protocol Relating to the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks art. 4, adopted
on June 27, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-41, available at http://www.wipo.int/
madrid/en/legal_texts/trtdocs_wo016.html; Thies Bosling, Securing Trademark
Protection in a Global Economy-the United States’ Accession to the Madrid Protocol, 12 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137 (2004) (arguing the United States acceptance of the
Madrid Protocol was important and will lead to further integration of international
trademark laws); John M. Murphy, Demystifying the Madrid Protocol, NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2004) (summarizing the Madrid Protocol and discussing it from a
U.S. applicant and foreign applicant point of view); L. Donald Prutzman, Overview of
the Madrid System and the United States Perspective, 25 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 173 (2012);
Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, International Trademark Prosecution
Streamlined: The Madrid Protocol Comes into Force in the United States, 12 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 151 (2004) (discussing the implementation of the Madrid Protocol); The
Madrid Protocol: Impact of U.S. Adherence on Trademark Law and Practice, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 1430 (2002) (discussing the effect of the Madrid Protocol on U.S.
trademark law and practice); Edwin E. Wallis III, Recent Development, The Madrid
Protocol: Will This International System Succeed in the United States?, 8 UCLA J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2004) (presenting a synopsis of the Madrid Protocol and its potential impact
on the United States); Peter Wilner, The Madrid Protocol: A Voluntary Model for the
Internationalization of Trademark Law, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 17 (2003)
(discussing the events leading up to the U.S. accession to the Madrid Protocol and
arguing that it exemplifies a voluntary model for the internationalization of trademark
law); Protecting Your Trademark Abroad: Twenty Questions About the Madrid
Protocol, WIPO http://www.wipo.org/freepublications/en/marks/428/wipo_pub_428.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (answering twenty questions concerning the Madrid
Protocol); The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/trtdocs_wo015.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2013).
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1996.82 The Madrid system enables applicants to file a single
registration, facilitating the global spread and growth of brands. Under
the Madrid system, a firm that already has a trademark in one of the
participating countries can apply to register that mark in other
participating countries. The top users of the Madrid system utilize a
global branding strategy, enabling them to market a single brand in
multiple markets, reflecting both market power and dominance.83 One
business owner said that Madrid is essential for a global branding
strategy: “Through Madrid we can get quicker into markets. This
means we gain time and the whole management of IP is different.
There are not 50 different systems, but everything is much simpler.”84
The advantages of the Madrid system are manifold — it reduces the
costs associated with trademark registration and streamlines the
process. The Madrid system has been heralded for its low costs —
Microsoft has claimed that costs have gone down 40% in its
international filings.85 Empiricists have also found a positive
correlation between the growth of global trade and the rise of filings
and renewals under the Madrid system.86 In 1985, there were only
50,000 nonresident trademark registrations, comprising 28% of the
global trade marks registered; as compared with 760,000 such
registrations in 2007, making up now 36% of those marks in 2007.87
However much the Madrid system does to advance trademark
cosmopolitanism, it is not perfect. The system is mostly a procedural
one, it does not actually substantively examine the specific
trademarks. Instead, the substantive application takes place in the
originating country, otherwise known as the Country of Origin.88 As a
result, since trademark laws vary so widely, it is entirely possible to
82

Ghafele, supra note 74, at 161.
Smith, supra note 75, at 7 (citing Ghafele, supra note 74, at 166).
84
Ghafele, supra note 74, at 166.
85
See Transcript from the Video Interview with Microsoft on the Madrid System,
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/transcript/microsoft.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2013).
86
Ghafele, supra note 74, at 161-62.
87
Smith, supra note 75, at 6 (citing Eugenia Baroncelli et al., The Global
Distribution of Trademarks: Some Stylized Facts, 28 WORLD ECON. 765 (2005)). The
bulk of nonresident applications are filed from high income countries; Germany,
France, and the United States accounted for 34% of trademark registration in 2007. Id.
(citing Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks: Summary Report for
the Year 2007, WIPO 8, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/madrid/en/statistics/
pdf/summary2007.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013)).
88
See Rachelle H. Thompson, Trademarks in International and Comparative Law:
International Trademark Protection Strategy, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 479, 494
(2004).
83
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have a mark protected in one country but not in another. Similarly,
these registrations are also deeply dependent on the home country —
so that whatever happens to the national trademark, an amendment,
cancellation, denial, withdrawal, happens to the international one as
well, although it is possible to convert some applications into national
ones.89 There is also not a lot of room for movement in terms of
localizing or nationalizing global brands filed under the Madrid system
— any slight change in the trademark’s status usually requires a
refile.90
However mixed some of the reviews may be of the Madrid system, it
is patently clear that Madrid reflects, in some ways, an
institutionalized cosmopolitanist outlook that bridges the link
between corporations and government systems in the process of global
branding. Even as it actively facilitates global branding, it is also
intrinsically designed to overlook national differences in trademark
registration, the protection of speech, and so on. Further, Madrid is
only one example of the trend towards trademark harmonization. The
Community Trademark in Europe (“CTM”) is another example of a
harmonized regime, facilitating a single process of registration for all
states in Europe. This single registration is valid for all of the member
countries of the European Union,91 and there are a variety of other,
international, means towards trademark harmonization. Here, the
European Trademark Office offers the European Trademark, which
gives uniform protection for all identical brand names after a single
registration is filed with the office of harmonization. The CTM is
widely considered to be a model for future calls towards greater
trademark harmonization, suggesting that it may serve as an
inspiration for a future, unitary global system of trademark
protection.92
Yet optimistic predictions of the rise of global trademarking can
often belie a more complicated reality regarding the distributive effects
of harmonization.93 At the same time that this global trend has
89

See Ghafele, supra note 74, at 164-65.
See id. at 165.
91
See Thompson, supra note 88, at 481.
92
See Timothy W. Blakeley, Beyond the International Harmonization of Trademark
Law: The Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary Transnational Trademark
Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 311 (2000).
93
In a provocative article, Marshall Leaffer discusses how the terms
“globalization” and “harmonization” often suggest a zero-sum game that creates
winners in the form of multinational companies, who switch locations to maximize on
labor costs, benefit at the cost of developing nations, unskilled workers, and small
businesses, who comprise the losers in the path towards transnationalism. See
90
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unfolded, for example, it is important to mention that there are some
islands of resistance to the global branding trend. One study on the
Madrid Protocol has discovered, for example, that India and South
Africa have demonstrated some forms of discrimination in the
registration process against foreign firms.94 This finding resonates with
the research done by another scholar, who has found evidence of
trademark protectionism in China, Hong Kong, India, and South
Africa, noting that “discrimination is more likely to occur when
products offered by foreign firms are of similar quality to the ones
produced by domestic firms.”95
Further, perhaps one of the greatest issues faced by the rise of
trademark cosmopolitanism is how to reconcile the protection of
intellectual property with the protection of other fundamental rights,
like the freedom of expression. Some countries, like the United States,
expressly protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, and
some courts offer specific protections for things like parody; and still
other commonwealth countries, like the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Australia, do not have a constitutional right to freedom
of speech, but recognize its existence in statutes or common law.96 In
addition, there has been very little discussion of the importance of
protecting freedom of expression at the treaty negotiation level,
suggesting that many of these issues are considered to be best left to
the local and regional judicial systems to sort through. For example,
according to Lisa Ramsey, the legislative history suggests that there
was almost no discussion of the conflict between trademark rights and
freedom of expression during the TRIPS negotiations.97 Neither the
Paris Convention, nor TRIPS, nor the Madrid Protocols have any
formal declaration of a commitment to freedom of expression,
suggesting that it never rose to a level of importance as a fundamental

generally Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1998) (demonstrating how globalization has helped in the
progressing of international norms and changing trademark law).
94
Smith, supra note 75, at 8 (citing Eugenia Baroncelli et al., Trademark Protection
or Protectionism, 15 REV. INT’L ECON. 126, 128 (2007)).
95
Eugenia Baroncelli et al., Trademark Protection or Protectionism, 15 REV. INT’L
ECON. 126, 140 (2007). This is unsurprising, given some history: In the 1970s and
1980s, India required that foreign brands be linked to local allied companies so that
local companies could benefit from the brand equity that foreign trademarks enjoyed.
Kate Gillespie et al., Protecting Global Brands: Toward a Global Norm, 10 J. INT’L
MARKETING 99, 101 (2002).
96
See Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect
Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 412 (2010).
97
Id. at 415.
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part of the international architecture of trademark law. International
protections of copyright, in contrast, do have protections for freedom
of expression built into them.98 As the following Part suggests, this
absence has deep significance for the activist movements that target
multinational corporations and their practices, and for the flourishing
of freedom of speech, generally.
II.

THE TRANSNATIONAL ANTIBRAND

As the previous Part suggested, the emergence of trademark
cosmopolitanism can often implicate questions about freedom of
expression as a fundamental right, demonstrating another side to the
phenomenon of global branding — global antibranding. In just the last
few decades, a new activist movement has sprung up internationally
and domestically, engaging in artistic and political activity to challenge
the expansion of the brand into public discourse.99 Sometimes
antibrands might target a certain brand for opposition; at other times
(like Nadia Plesner’s evocation of an LVMH bag to bring attention to
Darfur), they might utilize a brand for the purposes of political,
satirical, or humorous commentary on another subject. And yet, the
ways in which these artists have done so have raised complicated
questions of identity, language, and control — setting up a clash
between the international standards for freedom of speech and
intellectual property.100
Transnational activism of this sort is also deeply connected to the
rise of trademark cosmopolitanism, even if there is not always a
perfect identicality between the two. The rise of the global
antibranding movement is intimately tied to the rise of global
branding: one cannot have one without the other, and the
proportional growth of the antibrand is tied to the growth of the
brand. Much of the activities of antibrand activists, therefore, is deeply
98

See Martin Senftleben, The Trademark Tower of Babel — Dilution Concepts in
International, US and EC Trademark Law, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
45, 62 (2009). For example, whereas many sections of the Berne convention leave
room for freedom of expression, trademark law only has a section in Article 17 that
provides for “fair use of descriptive terms,” but no reference to the protection of
parody. Id. (quoting Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154).
99
For more on this phenomenon, see Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 492, 499-512 (2006) [hereinafter Semiotic Disobedience], and
Sonia Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (2010) [hereinafter Antibranding].
100
Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99, at 797-98.
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tied to targeting CSR practices — drawing attention to current events,
or using brands to comment on issues involving racial inequities,
distributive injustice, labor issues, and the like. In other words, the
same elements that contribute to the global consumption of brands
can often contribute to global anti-consumption of them as well. As
Rosemary Coombe has written: “Protests against sweatshop labour
practices, and the movement of big box stores and fast food franchises
into communities, suggest that the trademark now provides a site and
a symbol around which to resist forms of commodification that people
find contrary to their understandings of community and social
justice.”101
A. The Rise of Cosmopolitan Political Solidarity
Benedict Anderson’s famous book Imagined Communities powerfully
postulated that a nation is conceived, not as a reality, but as a
collective work of imagination that has emerged from the circulation
of capital and the rise of print communication.102 From this starting
point, a number of scholars relied on Anderson for a deeper study of
nationalism and the territorial impulse.103 Writing on Anderson,
Partha Chatterjee writes that the newspaper, the novel, and other
forms of print media “afford the opportunity for individuals to

101

Matthew Rimmer, The Black Label: Trademark Dilution, Culture Jamming, and
the No Logo Movement, 5 SCRIPT-ED 70, 80 (2008) (quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, The
Politics of Intellectual Property, The Joint Graduate Programme in Communication and
Culture). Coombe’s work is foundational to understanding the relationship between
trademarks and social movements. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 7 (1998)
(expanding the impact of intellectual properties beyond considerations of legal
doctrine to include its cultural impact on society); Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope,
and Longing for the Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global
Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1171, 1182-86 (2003); see also
TARROW, supra note 16, at 43-45 (discussing the rise of transnational activism).
102
See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 30 (1991).
103
See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 90 (1995); Evan Charney, Identity and Liberal Nationalism, 97 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 295, 302 (2003); Gerald W. Creed, Constituted Through Conflict: Images of
Community (and Nation) in Bulgarian Rural Ritual, 106 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56, 5658, 68-69 (2004) (describing Anderson’s work on nationalism as “especially
catalytic”); Robert J. Foster, Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene, 20 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 235, 238-39, 250, 253-55 (1991); Benjamin I. Schwartz, Culture,
Modernity, and Nationalism — Further Reflections, 122 DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at
207, 217-22; Kok-Chor Tan, Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice, 5 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 431, 453 (2002).
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imagine themselves as members of larger than face-to-face solidarities,
of choosing to act on behalf of those solidarities, of transcending by an
act of political imagination the limits imposed by traditional
practices.”104
Today, some have argued, and I would agree, that Anderson’s
observations can profitably extend to today’s global circulation of
media, and relatedly, to the emergence of cosmopolitan forms of
solidarity.105 After all, if print media helped individual citizens imagine
the nation, then why can the rapid circulation of new media not help
individuals imagine a similar kind of imagination of a collective,
cosmopolitanist global identity? And why can the same not be true of
the transnational consumption of global branding as well? Does the
transnational circulation of brands signify a new global order, an
imagined community of consumers — and an imagined community of
global activists? As Arjun Appardurai observes, these transnational
solidarities are crafted from, not nationalism, but from a commonality
of tastes, of pleasures, and of politics, what Appadurai calls
“communit[ies] of sentiment.”106
Even as a purely non-legal matter, I would also argue that
Anderson’s construction of the imagined community perfectly tracks
similar observations regarding the cosmopolitanist trajectories of both

104

Partha Chatterjee, Anderson’s Utopia, 29 DIACRITICS, Winter 1999, at 128, 128.
Maria Kyriakidou, Imagining Ourselves Beyond the Nation? Exploring
Cosmopolitanism in Relation to Media Coverage of Distant Suffering, 9 STUD. ETHNICITY
& NATIONALISM 481, 485 (2009); see also Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference
in the Global Cultural Economy, 7 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, June 1990, at 295, 29597. See generally ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996) (discussing Anderson’s “print capitalism” — the notion that
collective experience through mass media contributes to the creation of imagined
communities); Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in
COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing Anderson as part of an overall change
in the definition of cosmopolitanism).
106
Kyriakidou, supra note 105, at 485 (quoting APPADURAI, supra note 105, at 8
(quoting Arjun Appadurai, Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu India,
in LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICS OF EMOTION 94 (C.A. Lutz & L. Abu-Lughod eds.,
1990))). Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz described cosmopolitanists in a similar fashion:
105

Some of them may wish to redefine the nation . . . others again are in the
nation but not a part of it. They may be the real cosmopolitans, or they may
indeed owe a stronger allegiance to some other kind of imagined
international community . . . . There may be divided commitments,
ambiguities, and conflicting resonances as well.
TARROW, supra note 16, at 43-45 (quoting ULF HANNERZ, TRANSNATIONAL
CONNECTIONS: CULTURE, PEOPLE, PLACES 90 (1996)).
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global consumption and anti-global activism.107 In the case of global
consumption, as I suggested in Part I, we see a cosmopolitanist
trajectory that embraces the increasing unification of global brands
that operate to help individuals imagine themselves as part of a
broader, global community of other consumers. But in the case of the
anti-globalization activist, the lingua franca of the antibrand operates
similarly, just in reverse. As scholars have argued, many transnational
activists presume a kind of cosmopolitan solidarity across borders that
transforms “national citizens into global citizens by creating
obligations towards people suffering outside the nation.”108
There is also a fascinating parallel between the cosmopolitanist
consumption that I detailed in Part I, and the antibranding activists I
detail in this Part and elsewhere.109 Like consumers of global brands,
many cosmopolitan activists accept multiplicities of roots and plural
loyalties, and although they move outside of their spatial origins, they
continue to be linked to a concept of place and the resources and
opportunities that place offers them.110 As a result, the imagined
community, here, is not a community of consumers, but of activists
who are often deeply critical of the practices of multinational
corporations and global branding. These activists are defined as
transnational because they mobilize domestic and international
resources in order to advance claims on behalf of external actors or in
favor of goals they may hold in common with other transnational
allies.111 These individuals typify the trend of “activism beyond
borders,” and they comprise groups of immigrant and labor activists,
ecologists, and other political actors who may exist loosely outside of
state formation.112
107
See TARROW, supra note 16, at 41-42 (arguing that the cosmopolitanist
trajectory is far more ethically and politically oriented than other accounts suggest).
108
Kyriakidou, supra note 105, at 482 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Kate Nash, Global Citizenship as Show Business: The Cultural
Politics of Make Poverty History, 30 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 167, 168 (2008)).
109
See, e.g., Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, supra note 99 (connecting artistic
disobedience, activism and antibranding); Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99
(describing the complex interrelationship between branding and antibranding).
110
See TARROW, supra note 16, at 42; see also Mitchell Cohen, Rooted
Cosmopolitanism, 39 DISSENT, Fall 1992, at 478, 483.
111
TARROW, supra note 16, at 43.
112
Id. at 9-10 (quoting MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, at xii (1998)). Due to their
language proficiency and connectedness to international issues, people, and places,
these activists are able to leverage their more nuanced understanding of society’s
connectedness on an international level. Id. at 43; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra, at 2
(discussing the increasing significance and relevancy of activist networks).
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Indeed, as Douglas Holt has explained, at times, global branding has
lost its luster precisely because multinational corporations have
become vulnerable to charges from anti-globalization activists. “Who
can forget,” Holt writes, “the images of angry demonstrators smashing
the windows of a McDonald’s outlet in Davos, Switzerland, or
stomping Coke cans in Seattle?”113 Labor, pollution, and cultural
imperialism concerns operate at the forefront of activist agendas,
which tend to coalesce around the global branding enterprise.114 As
the journalist Naomi Klein recounts in her book, No Logo, the
antibranding movement operates at the cross-section between art,
labor, and anti-globalization.115 By targeting companies that have
invested millions in building strong global brands, antibranders seek
to expose potential hypocrisy between corporate philosophy and
corporate activity to the average consumer.116 Indeed, evidence has
suggested that in countries with weak or underenforced
environmental regulations, companies tend to adopt private regulatory
programs only when their overseas clients and shareholders demand
it.117 As a result, antibranding activism often exploits the same tools
used in advertising — powerful visuals, brand recognition, catchy
slogans, and emotionally scripted language — to get their message out
to the public.
It is therefore no surprise that much of the world’s most prominent
trademark cases regarding antibranding have come from one of the
largest and most international environmental action groups:
Greenpeace. In 2010, in response to the British Petroleum oil spill in
the Gulf, Greenpeace, an environmental awareness group, announced
a contest to “Redesign BP’s logo,” explaining:

113
114
115
116

Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69.
Id. at 69-70.
Rimmer, supra note 101, at 78-80.
Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99, at 811-12.
Anti-sweatshop movements were galvanized in 1992 when the National
Labor Committee performed an expose of corporate and U.S. government
subsidies of maquilas. Afterward, major labels like the GAP, Nike, Disney,
and Guess were forced to respond to consumer concerns about their labor
practices with partners in developing nations, even though they had claimed
only years earlier to be “innocent global shoppers.”

Id. (quoting Martin Morris, Contradictions of Post-Modern Consumerism and Resistance,
64 STUD. POL. ECON. 25, 26 (2001)).
117
Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, Signaling Environmental Stewardship in the
Shadow of Weak Governance: The Global Diffusion of ISO 14001, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
345, 367-68 (2013).
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A few years ago, BP rebranded themselves as “beyond
petroleum.” And yet BP is pursuing . . . deepwater drilling,
despite the massive environmental damage that’s being caused
by their business.
That’s why we want you to rebrand them.
The campaign concludes: “BP’s slick green logo doesn’t suit a
company that engages in dangerous offshore drilling. We’re inviting
you to design them a new logo that’s more suitable for their dirty
business.”118 Greenpeace’s work was particularly effective at changing
the semiotic import of British Petroleum’s massive advertising
campaign to highlight its focus on clean energy. After a few of these
graphic interventions, it was hard to see British Petroleum’s
advertising campaign in the light it had originally intended.119
In addition to a growing concern about CSR, a second factor has
added to the growth in antibranding: the increasing force of
“consumer sovereignty,” which has led many consumers to respond
and publicize their complaints against particular corporations.120
These dynamics have reframed the relationship between advertising
and consumers into a much more dialogic relationship, as opposed to
a one-way relationship of corporate inculcation. “Ethical shareholders,
culture jammers, street reclaimers, McUnion organizers, human rights
hacktivists, school-logo fighters and Internet corporate watchdogs are
at the early stages of demanding a citizen-centered alternative to the
international rule of the brands,” Naomi Klein writes in No Logo.121 In
many cases, antibranding activists have decidedly turned to the
advertising executives’ own arsenal of tools to address consumer
concerns, using appropriative strategies to address the increasing
dominance of branding strategies in both private and public space.
118
Redesign BP’s Logo, GREENPEACE (June 15, 2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/
usa/news/gulf-oil-spill/bp-logo.
119
See Malla Pollack, The Romantic Corporation: Trademark, Trust, and Tyranny, 42
U. BALT. L. REV. 81, 143 (2012) (discussing BP’s rebranding efforts).
120
See Robert Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT.
L. REV. 503, 503 (2001) (defining consumer sovereignty as “the state of affairs where
the consumer has the power to define his or her own wants”). For more discussion on
the role of the consumer, see Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened
Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 854-62 (2004); Barton Beebe, Search and
Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2025-26 (2005); Ralph S.
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YALE L.J. 1165, 1180-84 (1948); Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in
Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 785 (2008).
121
Rimmer, supra note 101, at 79 (quoting NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT
THE BRAND BULLIES 445-46 (2009)).
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Many of these practices intrinsically raise trademark concerns,
however. Consider, again, the story of Nadia Plesner and her
relationship to the crisis in Darfur. Plesner’s ability to use LVMH bags
as a floating signifier of political import is also, in part, a function of
the same variety of elements that facilitate brand transnationalism.122
Yet Plesner felt, like many cosmopolitanists, a moral duty to draw
attention to the crisis — a keen desire born from a foundational belief
in the shared responsibility of humankind. Every aspect of her
political expression — from the conceptualization of the project, to its
execution, to her attempts to secure legal protection for her expression
— was tied to other localities.123 Further, Plesner’s intent in drawing a
transhistorical connection between Picasso’s antiwar position and her
own critique of celebrity branding, luxury, and contemporary political
culture was also meant to place use of the LVMH logo at the center of
her expression. Whereas Picasso’s earlier iconoclastic work of art
targeted governments, Plesner’s work drew attention to the need for
targeting global luxury brands and the consumptive practices that
exalted them. Moreover, as the legal dispute over Nadia Plesner’s work
demonstrated, much of the conflict played out in reference to the
global visibility of LVMH’s brand — which operated as a symbol and
vessel for both commentary on the global presence of luxury brands,
cosmopolitanist consumption, and the need for international social
justice and awareness.
There was no doubt that Plesner’s use of the image was deliberately
provocative, in that she had already been sued by Louis Vuitton. But it
is also fascinating that Louis Vuitton chose to pursue a case against
her when its previous threats against her led to such criticism in the
press.124 The court’s reaction to the Darfunica case, though, was
122
See generally TARROW, supra note 16, at 35-56 (discussing the role of the
availability of rapid forms of personal and digital communication, the widespread use
of English, the ease of international travel, and the diffuse spread of knowledge from
the Web).
123
She kept a widely read blog on the creation of her painting, Darfunica, making
daily updates to the painting that were explicitly linked to the ever-changing political
conditions in the Sudan. See Lucie Guibault, The Netherlands: Darfunica, Miffy and the
Right to Parody!, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFOR. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 236, 244 (2011)
(quoting from the translated decision Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 4 mei 2011, KG 2011, 294
m.nt. (Plesner Joensen/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), translation available at
http://www.nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living--darfurnica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf).
124
There was, however, a key reason for LVMH’s choice to sue. Contrary to the
settlement in 2008, this time, Plesner — probably in a show of provocation to LVMH
— planned to market sales of t-shirts and other goods that depicted the same image
that LVMH had already objected to. When they discovered Plesner’s commercial
plans, LVMH was, understandably, quite incensed. After the piece was finished,
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fascinating. Both parties, in fashioning their arguments, relied on
different sections of the European Convention on Human Rights;
Plesner relied on the right of freedom of expression, and Louis Vuitton
relied on the fundamental right to property (and relatedly, intellectual
property).125 At first, the lower court ruled in favor of LVMH in its bid
for a preliminary injunction, ruling in favor of its intellectual property
rights. It concluded that a subsequent use of the picture in an
announcement for the artist’s upcoming exhibition was an “eyecatcher,” and thus unjustified because it functioned as an
advertisement for the artist’s own work.126 But a few months later, the
same court reversed its position after fully adjudicating the issue,
deciding to rule in favor of Plesner based on her freedom of expression
claim instead.127 In an insightful citation, the court explained that
property rights needed to take a secondary role to the protection of
freedom of speech, noting: “Opposite Louis Vuitton’s fundamental
right to peaceful enjoyment of its exclusive rights to the use of the
design, there is, according to established case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, the fundamental right of Plesner that is high
in a democratic society’s propriety list to express her opinion through
her art.”128
Central, of course, to the court’s determination was its conclusion
that Plesner’s activities, contrary to LVMH’s arguments, did not take
place in the commercial realm. “[A]rtists enjoy a considerable
protection with regard to their artistic freedom, in which, in principle,
art may ‘offend, shock or disturb.’ . . . Plesner’s intention with ‘Simple
Living’ is not (or was not) to free ride with Louis Vuitton’s reputation
in a commercial sense,” the court concluded.129 Instead, it found that
Plesner’s juxtaposition of LVMH logos and glamorous images with the
LVMH again decided to seek action to stop the work from being shown, this time
from a court in The Hague. Just as it had previously done, the company argued that
Plesner had illegally appropriated its marks.
125
Guibault, supra note 123, at 236. Note that LVMH argued that its fundamental
right to property was violated, under the European Convention on Human Rights, and
extended this fundamental right to intellectual property, which the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) did in the Anheuser/Busch decision. Plesner’s freedom of
expression claim, in contrast, comes from Article 10 of the ECHR, which protects the
right to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas. See id. at 245. For further
discussion on Article 10, see Coenraad Visser, The Location of the Parody Defence in
Copyright Law: Some Comparative Perspectives, 38 CILSA 321, 339-41 (2005).
126
See Guibault, supra note 123, at 244 (quoting from a translation of the
decision).
127
See id. at 237.
128
See id. at 246.
129
Id.
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crisis in Darfur was consistent with her critique of luxury and
affluence in a time of famine. Indeed, the court explained her
motivation as follows:
[S]he wished to draw attention to the poignant difference
between luxury and affluence on the one hand, and poverty
and famine in Darfur on the other hand. She has expressed the
aspect of luxury by using the Design of [LVMH] in her work
of art. She has succeeded in her purpose. Partly because of her
work of art, the genocide in Darfur came to the attention of
the general public in 2008.130
It compared Plesner’s symbolic brand appropriation to that of a
newspaper, ascribing it an informational function by concluding that
“a newspaper should not have a lesser far-reaching protection of the
freedom of speech” because it pursues profits with the articles it
publishes.131 Significantly, in a curt line or two, the court ordered
LVMH to pay Plesner’s legal fees, and also quashes the previous order
with retroactive effect, meaning that any penalties that Plesner faced
would no longer be due.132
B. Three Antibrand Examples
Decades ago, Beaumarchais wrote, “Provided that, in my writings, I
speak neither of the authorities, nor of religion, nor of politics, nor of
morals, nor of the people in power, nor of the bodies in credit, nor of
the opera, nor of other performances, nor of anyone who believes in
anything, I shall be free to print whatsoever I choose, subject to
inspection by two or three censors.”133 This famous quote, one
trademark scholar argued, is especially pertinent in this day and age,
noting that “it would probably now be necessary to add trade marks to
130
Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 4 mei 2011, KG 2011, 294 m.nt. (Plesner
Joensen/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), translation available at http://www.
nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living--darfurnica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf.
131
Guibault, supra note 123, at 247.
132
See id. at 248. Thrilled with the decision, Plesner told Eyeteeth, a blog, that
“[t]oday is a great day for art. . . . If I had lost this, I believe it would have caused
many artists to censor their own work to avoid legal trouble. Now we have won back
our freedom to make reference to the modern society we live in.” Nadia Plesner on
Louis Vuitton Case: “This is a Great Day for Art,” EYETEETH (May 4, 2011, 11:22 AM),
http://eyeteeth.blogspot.com/2011/05/nadia-plesner-on-louis-vuitton-case.html.
133
See Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence
of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371, 371 (2006) [hereinafter “Constitutionalising”] (quoting
Beaumarchais).
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the list of subjects that must be treated with delicacy and, in place of
the censor, the large companies that hold these trade marks.”134
In some ways, the antibranding activism that has evolved in the last
decade or so reflects so much of the globalization that it often opposes.
The problem that our antibranding movements demonstrate, however,
is that while brands — and even antibrands — are now global and
cosmopolitanist in character, the doctrinal architecture that protects
them and enables them to flourish is not. As a result, the existing case
law reflects an emerging confusion regarding how trademarks are
viewed, both internationally and domestically, and whether antibrands
are constitutionally protected. How do we balance protection of
trademark property with protection for freedom of speech? Many
cases take approaches that are similar to the Plesner case: where a
court might begin by awarding relief to the trademark owner, but then
take the opposite holding on appeal, usually after global media
attention ensues, and the appeals court has a chance to consider other
approaches.
Cases like Plesner’s, I would argue, illustrate yet another aspect of
trademark cosmopolitanism, because they underscore the increasing
globalization of brands as well as the jurisprudential frameworks that
govern them. Here, I examine three separate cases — one involving
parodic T-shirts from South Africa (the famous Laugh it Off case),135
another case involving Greenpeace’s appropriation of a logo in France,
and a third case involving an appropriated TATA company logo in
India. My principal argument in this section is that just as we are
seeing the emergence of a global branding movement, we are also
seeing a global antibranding movement. However, national disparities
regarding whether parody is a constitutionally protected freedom carry
dramatic implications for the movement’s future, raising critical
questions about the future of reconciling trademark cosmopolitanism
with the freedom of political and artistic expression.
1.

Laughing It Off in South Africa

The Laugh it Off case, which concerned the conflict over parody and
property, is probably one of the most prominent antibranding cases
outside of the United States. The plaintiff, South African Breweries, or
SAB, is one of the leading beers in the country of South Africa, and a
134

Id.
See Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. African Breweries Int’l (Fin.) BV t/a Sabmark
Int’l & Another 2005 (8) BCLR 743 (CC) at 39 para. 65 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Laugh It
Off].
135
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pervasive advertiser of its brand.136 The defendant, on the other hand,
Laugh it Off, is a corporation that engages in the appropriation of
brands for the purposes of humor and social commentary. According
to its website, the company has two objectives: one, to create a close
association with well-known brands, and two, to make fun of them.137
This particular case is illustrative of how localized antibrand
expression can often give rise to questions of international,
constitutional importance. In that case, the defendant replaced SAB’s
trademark, which said “Black Label,” with “Black Labour,” and the
slogan, “America’s Lusty, Lively Beer — Brewed in South Africa,” was
replaced with “Africa’s Lusty, Lively Exploitation Since 1652 — No
Regard Given Worldwide.” After SAB sent several cease and desist
letters in 2002 that went unanswered, it decided to commence
litigation.138 At issue in the case was whether the mark had taken
unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to the reputation of the Black
Label mark.139 In its defense, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
had not established a likelihood of detriment, and that even if such a
likelihood had been established, the antibrand was protected by the
South African Constitution’s protection for freedom of expression.140
After having lost several times before the lower courts, Justin Nurse,
the company founder of Laugh it Off, decided to appeal his case to the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the highest court, and won, in a
surprising, landmark defense of freedom of expression over
trademarks as property. For scholars, Laugh it Off represents an
136

Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8. According to the company’s founder, Justin Nurse, a journalism
graduate student, his work constitutes “ideological jujitsu,” whereupon brands are
appropriated, but slightly modified, to send an alternative message. “The purpose,”
the defendant explained, “is to lampoon the brands, to make a statement about the
company’s policies or practices; to probe issues bearing on the broader society; to
assert free expression and in doing so to challenge the inordinate use of trade mark
laws to silence expressions that are unflattering about brands.” Id. at 9-10.
138
This was not the first time Nurse ran into trouble with trademark owners.
Laugh it Off previously faced legal action initiated by Lego for a T-shirt design that
used lego blocks with the word “Legover” underneath. Owners of the brand “Weetbix” had objected to another shirt that featured the logo, “Weed-brix,” Red Bull to a
shirt that said “Dead Bull,” the soap brand Dettol to a shirt that said “Death Toll,” and
the denim brand “Diesel for Successful Living” similarly expressed displeasure over a
shirt that said “Denial for Successful Loafing.” Coca-Cola claimed trademark
infringement over a shirt that said, “Corruption.” There were other brands that did
not object, however, like Kentucky Fried Chicken, which was called “Unlucky Fried
Chicken,” or Virgin, which became “Viagra.” See Rimmer, supra note 101, at 73-74.
139
See Thea Illsley, How to Tell a Take-Off from a Rip-Off: Trade Mark Parody and
Freedom of Expression in South Africa: Notes and Comments, 22 SAJHR 119-20 (2006).
140
Id. at 120.
137
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example of how anti-global activist movements have raised
international, critical questions for scholars of both intellectual
property and constitutional law.141 Yet the opinion, in and of itself,
demonstrates a judicially-oriented cosmopolitanist masterpiece,
demonstrating a significant array of global constitutional borrowing by
the international range of the cases cited by the Court in reaching its
decision.142
Consider, at the outset, the question of the standard for trademark
infringement, which drew heavily from foreign jurisdictions. The
Court notes, for example, that its trademark provisions bear nearcomplete identicality to similar protections from the European
Directive and the United Kingdom.143 There was, however, one
significant difference — whereas those statutes required proof of
actual detriment or unfair advantage, South Africa required only a
“likelihood” of unfair advantage or detriment.144 Significantly, despite
this more relaxed standard, the Constitutional Court still decided to
protect the antibrand, reversing the lower courts’ earlier opinions. Part
of the reason for this outcome, of course, stemmed from the delicate
balancing of constitutional freedoms with intellectual property. In
South Africa, freedom of expression is constitutionally protected by

141

Australian scholar Matthew Rimmer writes, for example, of the need to
contextualize the dispute over the Black Label mark “in the context of wider debates
over trade mark law, culture jamming, and the No Logo anti-global capitalism
movement.” Rimmer, supra note 101, at 86.
142
I have described this phenomenon elsewhere, as others have. See Sonia K.
Katyal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1422 (2010) (collecting
citations); see also Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation:
Lessons from South Africa, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 79, 92 (2010).
143
Section 10(3) the United Kingdom (UK) Trade Marks Act 1994, which was
fashioned along the provisions of the first European Directive, provides that “A person
infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign which - (a) is
identical or similar to the trade mark, and (b) is used in relation to goods and services
which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the trade
mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being without
cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or
repute of the trade mark.” Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 10 (Eng.).
144
See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 13 para. 21. According to the constitutional court,
Article 5(2) of the European Directive and Section 10(3) of the 1994 United Kingdom
Act are virtually identical, but require proof of actual detriment or unfair advantage;
the South African section requires a likelihood of unfair advantage or detriment,
stating “the use of the trademark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be
detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trademark,
notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.” Charles Webster, Laugh It Off
Gets Last Laugh in Dilution Case, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (July 1, 2005), http://
www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/LaughItOffGetsLastLaughinDilutionCase.aspx.
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Section 16 of the Constitution, which protects the right, along with
the “freedom of artistic creativity” and “freedom to receive or impart
information or ideas,” along with other forms of protection.145
In the case of Laugh it Off, the Constitutional Court took the view
that the right to hold intellectual property was not universally
accepted as a fundamental right, but still informally treated it as such
for the purposes of the opinion.146 The lower court, in contrast, had
refused to consider a defense of freedom of expression for two
principal reasons: first, because of the commercial purpose of the
shirts; and second, because it found that the message went beyond
parody and bordered, instead, on hate speech because of its invocation
of race and inequality.147 On appeal before the Supreme Court of
Appeal (“SCA”), Laugh it Off fared no better.148 Although the SCA
noted that unlike fixed property, intellectual property enjoyed no
special status under the Constitution, it chose to protect the property
rights of SAB over the interests in freedom of expression.149 For the
SCA, like the lower court, the expression on the shirt was found to
create an association that was “particularly unwholesome, unsavoury,
or degrading” because it constituted an “unfair” and “unjustified racial
slur” on SAB.150 Under this view, Laugh it Off could have easily
expressed an identical message about “black labour” and “white guilt”
without appropriating the specific brand at issue. There was no parody
here, SCA concluded, because Laugh it Off was not commenting on
SAB, but merely employing SAB in service of its humor. In other

145

See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 2 para. 2.
One scholar reported that the Laugh It Off judgment’s most promising aspect
involved “its unequivocal recognition that the right to hold intellectual property is in
effect a right, of equal status to the specified fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights
such as freedom of speech and privacy.” Owen H. Dean, The Irresistible Force of
Freedom of Speech Meets the Immovable Object: Trade Mark Law in South Africa, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 614, 617, 619 (2006).
147
See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 10 para. 15.
148
The plaintiff had merely asserted a likelihood of harm, by pointing out that the
racial slur would build a racially insensitive association with the company, erode the
exclusiveness of its mark, and discourage people from purchasing the beer. Yet
because these harms were all largely speculative, and were not accompanied by added
evidence or facts showing the probability of these events taking place, the
Constitutional Court rejected them. “It is plain from the record that no evidence,
direct or inferential, was adduced to establish likelihood of detriment either in the
sense of unfavourable associations that have been created . . . or in the context of a
likelihood of loss of sales by virtue of the reduced commercial magnetism of the
mark.” See id. at 35-36 para. 58.
149
See Dean, supra note 146, at 616.
150
See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 13 para. 21.
146
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words, if the antibrand had not become an actual “brand,” in the sense
of the shirts becoming a commodity in the court’s eyes, it might have
remained protected had it remained entirely noncommercial.151
In contrast, the Constitutional Court’s main holding concluded that
SAB had failed to show proof of infringement, because there had been
no showing of material harm.152 Citing the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., the court
wrote that “in order to succeed, the owner of the mark bears the onus
to demonstrate likelihood of substantial harm or detriment which,
seen within the context of the case, amounts to unfairness.”153 The
mere fact that the expressive act causes some discomfort or “appear[s]
to be morally reprobate or unsavoury to others,” however, is irrelevant
if the expression is otherwise protected, the Court wrote.154
To the value of freedom of expression, the Court emphasized its
primary value by referencing its own decisions on the matter, in
addition to other jurisdictions — Canada and the United States in
particular. It also referenced the protection for freedom of expression
in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights as well as the
European Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.155 Yet while other antibrand decisions directly relied on the
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the South African
Laugh it Off case interpreted the work “in light of” fundamental rights,
which suggested at least some gentle reluctance to constitutionalizing

151
Consider the lower court’s formulation, drawing a line between protecting a
fundamental right of freedom of expression, and using a mark in the course of trade:

[Appellant] may not use [the mark] in relation to goods or services. The
appellant may use in relation to goods or services by placing the caricature
on T-shirts, flags or whatever provided it is not so used in the course of
trade. The appellant may declaim the message about black labour and white
guilt from rooftops, pulpits and political platforms; and it may place the
same words (without appropriating the registered marks’ repute) on Tshirts, and sell them.
See Dario Tanziani, South Africa: Trade Marks, Infringement, Tarnishing of Marks,
Defense of Freedom of Speech, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. N-4, N-8 (2005). Agreeing
with this provision, another scholar echoed that trademark law “hardly affects the
appellant’s freedom of expression. Freedom of expression does not entitle a party to
damage private property such as painting graffiti on private or even public property.
Why should it therefore be different simply because the property is a trade mark?” Id.
152
Illsley, supra note 139, at 120.
153
See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 31 para. 50.
154
Rimmer, supra note 101, at 97 (quoting Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 34 para. 55).
155
See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 27 para. 45.
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the right to antibrand.156 However, in a telling section, the Court cited
Laugh it Off’s position, extensively:
Brands, the applicant asserts, are often put to work by
powerful corporations to crowd out equally legitimate
expression. They tend to stifle the open and free flow of ideas.
Brand building, the applicant asserts, sets out to occupy
cultural space, social space, and even one’s own “headspace.”
Since, in time, marketing brands graduate to cultural icons,
they should not be beyond the reach of public disclaim or
indeed applause. The purposes of copyright and trade mark
laws in an open and democratic society is not to shut out
critical expression or to throttle artistic and other expressive
acts in a manner that gives way to inordinate brand sway.157
Turning to the anti-dilution/infringement provisions within South
African trademark law, the Court recognized a tension, noting that it
“limits the right to free expression,” but decided to reach a conclusion
that interpreted trademark principles in a way that ensured its
compatibility with freedom of expression.158 “Courts must be astute
not to convert the anti-dilution safeguard of renowned trade marks
usually controlled by powerful financial interests into a monopoly
adverse to other claims of expressive conduct of at least equal cogency
and worth in our broader society,” the Court observed.159
Finally, although the Court drew on the United States Supreme
Court’s landmark decision on parody, Campbell v. Acuff,160 it drew
back from the suggestion that parody was constitutionally protected,
but then still wound up protecting it anyway. It was unnecessary, in
the Court’s eyes, to consider the fairness of the parody because the
plaintiff had failed to establish the likelihood of economic prejudice.161
It must always be kept in mind that, unlike in the US, in our
jurisprudence there are no enclaves of protected expression
such as parody or satire and therefore the mere
characterization of an expression as such would not be
decisive of what is fair use under our anti-dilution protection
of section 34(1)(c) because ordinarily all categories of

156
157
158
159
160
161

See Geiger, “Constitutionalising,” supra note 133, at 396.
See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 49 para. 81.
Id. at 29-30 para. 48.
Id.
Id. at 39 para. 64.
See id. at 39-40 para. 66; see also Rimmer, supra note 101, at 99.
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expression, save those excluded by the Constitution itself,
enjoy constitutional shield and may be restricted only in a way
constitutionally authorised,
the Court concluded.162 In this manner, the Court carved out a
broader area of protection for expression like parody, but did so by
explaining that all speech is deserving of protection, not just parody
specifically.
In a heavily cited concurring opinion, Judge Sachs opened with the
question, “Does the law have a sense of humour?,” noting that judicial
views on parody are tremendously varied internationally. Although
parody is not a separate defense in South Africa, Judge Sachs also
wrote to underscore his finding that the commercial intent of Laugh it
Off should not detract from its constitutional protection. Instead, for
Judge Sachs, in a world where both artists and advertisers use cultural
icons to comment on society, the line between commercial and
noncommercial has disappeared.163 “In our consumerist society where
branding occupies a prominent space in our public culture,” Sachs
concludes, “one does not have to be a ‘cultural jammer’ to recognise
that there is a legitimate place for criticism of a particular trademark,
or of the influence of branding in general or of the overzealous use of
trademark law to stifle public debate. In such circumstances the
medium could well be the message, and the more the trademark itself
is both directly the target and the instrument, the more justifiable will
its parodic incorporation be.”164
As a final matter, the Court also demanded that SAB pay for Nurse’s
attorney’s fees, a significant win for Laugh it Off. In celebration of the
decision, Laugh it Off auctioned off 1,000 t-shirts and donated the
proceeds to an anti-alcohol abuse charity.165
2.

Protecting the Right to Critique: Greenpeace v. Esso

In France, the trajectory of such antibranding cases has revealed a
trend that resembles that of South Africa, demonstrating again the

162

See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 39-40 para. 66.
See id. at 51 para. 84 (referencing Steven M. Cordero, Note, Cocaine-Cola, the
Velvet Elvis, Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons,
8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599 (1988)).
164
See id. at 52 para. 86. As a result of the decision, another company, Telkom,
which had filed a defamation and copyright case against the creators of Helkom, a
parody site protesting the company, dropped the case. See Rimmer, supra note 101, at
103.
165
Rimmer, supra note 101, at 102.
163
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global, dyadic pull of both branding and antibranding phenomena,
and the tendency to borrow from other jurisdictions to resolve
conflicts between them.
Early cases, however, were not as friendly to the cause. Some French
courts had held that antibrand uses of trademarks could be infringing,
including the use of a trademark in an antismoking campaign (a pool
of tar emerging from a Marlboro packet, for example) or even the use
of a trademark in a newspaper headline.166 In another case, a lower
French court also held that a website calling for a boycott of the
Gervais Danone company was infringing.167
Like South Africa, more modern cases have reversed the trend, to
some extent, and reveal that most successful antibrand cases win on
appeal, and usually after the court employs case law from other
jurisdictions. For example, consider a case that involved an
antismoking campaign that used a dying Camel from the famous
cigarette maker producing smoke in the shape of a skull that also
accompanied the slogan, “The fag is worse than crossing the
desert . . . .”168 The French Supreme Court reversed a lower court
ruling that found infringement and instead found that the humorous
use of the mark served the goal to protect the public health of
adolescents.169
166
Christophe Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression — The
Proportionality of Criticism, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. 317, 319 (2007) [hereinafter
Trade Marks]. In one such case involving humor, the Paris High Court ruled that a
parody of the LACOSTE label crocodile that showed two fornicating crocodiles
accompanied by the expression, “Attention, j’accoste” (“Beware, I’m accosting”) was
infringing. In that case, the Court cast the expression as commercial and also
concluded that “the right to parody or caricature could not apply in a field which is
purely commercial.” See Jean-François Bretonnière & Cordélia Flourens, France:
Trademark Rights v. Free Speech: Can Prejudicial Trademark Use Still Be Prevented?, in 7
IP VALUE: BUILDING & ENFORCING INTELL. PROP. VALUE 136, 136-37 (2009), available at
http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/Article.ashx?g=46a24ecb-1bcd-4c10-be354854fdb8a9da (noting an initial trend towards holding defendants liable that has now
shifted towards protection of freedom of expression). Both a satirical treatment of the
trademark Pastis, and even a representation of a dying camel smoking a cigarette in an
antismoking campaign were also the subject of a successful tarnishment claim at the
lower court level. See Emmanuel Baud, The Damage Done, TRADEMARK WORLD, Apr.
2005, at 29, 30.
167
See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 137 (discussing the case’s
disposition).
168
Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 318.
169
See Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Marks and Human Rights, in 18 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 335, 350 (Paul Torremans ed., 2008) (citing Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct. 19, 2006, Bull. civ.
II, No. 1601 (Fr.)).
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Yet, like the South African case, it is important to note that in
France, parody is not a complete defense against trademark
infringement.170 Instead, it is simply one of a multiplicity of factors
that courts consider in deciding whether to protect the expression
through constitutional reasoning. The absence of clear protections for
parody, as we see in the Plesner and Laugh it Off cases, have the effect
of putting greater emphasis on other factors, like whether or not the
activity is commercially oriented. The same is true here, where the
absence of commercial intent can be a deciding factor in the
defendant’s favor.
In one particularly notable case, the company Esso decided to take
legal action against Greenpeace’s French organization, whose Stop
E$$O Campaign targeted the oil company for its environmental
practices. Esso (otherwise known as ExxonMobil) had argued that
Greenpeace’s use of the logo made it resemble the symbol of the Nazi
SS, thereby confusing the public, and putting it within the realm of
illegal hate speech associated with Nazi memorabilia.171
However, a French high court, while noting that parody was not a
complete defense, nevertheless decided to protect Greenpeace’s use of
the mark “E$$O” because Greenpeace did not aim to promote its
products commercially but instead only to express its political point of
view.172 It reached this conclusion, however, even though there was
evidence that the antibrands had been placed on t-shirts, and Esso
argued that even Greenpeace’s call for an Esso boycott had a
commercial impact.173 The court rejected the import of this evidence,

170

See Tanziani, supra note 151, at N−8.
Esso is ExxonMobil in France. See ExxonMobil Sues Over Logo ‘Abuse,’ BBC
NEWS WORLD EDITION (June 25, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
2064559.stm. Some part, it seems, of Esso’s allegations appeared tied to an earlier
speech case that held Yahoo liable, in part, for the auction of Nazi memorabilia in
France, which violates French law that prohibits the wearing or exhibition of Nazi
memorabilia. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 379
F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). Not only did Esso demand an end to the campaign,
but also claimed almost $80,000 in daily compensation to the company due to the
alleged cost of the infringement. “We find it ironic that the richest corporation in the
world can’t recognise the dollar sign, and confuses it with a Nazi symbol,” claimed
Greenpeace to the public. In response, Esso claimed that it was only trying to prevent
Greenpeace’s use of the logo, not alter Greenpeace’s message or stop them from
expressing themselves. See ExxonMobil Sues Over Logo ‘Abuse,’ supra.
172
See Tanziani, supra note 151, at N−8 to N−9 (discussing this case).
173
Esso Plc v. Greenpeace France, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Paris, 4e ch., Nov. 16, 2005, E.T.M.R. 2006, 53, 665, Carre-Pierrat (Fr.) [hereinafter
Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53].
171
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accusing Esso of displaying “the worst kind of bad faith” in suggesting
that such activities would have a business import.174
Instead, the court said that “the constitutional principle of the
freedom of expression implies that the organization . . . can, on its
internet site, criticize, in the form that it regards appropriate, the
damage to the environment and the risk caused to public health by
industrial activities . . . .”175 While characterizing the work as a parody,
but also characterizing it as an expression of noncommercial speech,
the court crafted out a special area of exception, it seems, for
expression motivated specifically by political purposes and limited to
the Internet. “[T]he defendant should be able to denounce attacks on
the environment and the risks to human health caused by certain
industrial activities, in whatever form it deemed best suited to the aim
pursued. While this freedom is not absolute, it may only be subject to
restrictions which are necessary to respect the rights of others,” the
court wrote.176
Although the case was a win for Greenpeace, it highlights a few
areas of concern for trademark scholars. The first area of concern
involves the reality that the French court implicitly suggests that
parody cases, when they are not cast as parody, can still be vulnerable
to a charge from a non-trademark claim, such as denigration,
disparagement, or defamation. In such cases, plaintiffs often employ
defamation or disparagement claims, in addition to the trademark
causes of action, sometimes with varying success. Under French law,
disparagement is described as “[a]ny act whatsoever which causes
damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred to
compensate it,” usually referring to conduct that aims to discredit or
belittle the plaintiff.177 (Some French courts have described
disparagement to involve “a polemical use alien to business life.”)178
In this case, Esso had charged that Greenpeace had sought to
denigrate and discredit Esso’s products and services. At the same time
that Esso made these allegations, however, it also admitted that
Greenpeace had not actually targeted or criticized any of its products
or services, but only restricted its critique to its logo specifically and to
discuss Esso’s role in climate change and its environmental

174

Id. at 666.
Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 321.
176
Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53, at 666.
177
Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 137 (quoting CODE
art. 1382 (Fr.)).
178
Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 322.
175
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practices.179 As a result, the court, in turn, rejected Esso’s allegations,
noting, “[i]t is, at the very least, paradoxical to invoke acts of
denigration — of which, incidentally, the exact nature is not stated . . .
and to assert that the products and services of the appellant company
were not subject to any criticism.”180 Given the content of
Greenpeace’s website, the court concluded that denigration was
completely unproven.
However, despite the outcome of the case in the Esso judgment, it
remains noteworthy that claims like denigration, disparagement, and
defamation can still be employed successfully against activist groups,
particularly at the lower court level. Lawyers have suggested that the
use of humor, like other types of parody, is defensible and protectable,
so long as the defendants do not use the trademark for a commercial
purpose, and so long as the trademark use is “proportionate,” meaning
that the use is not outrageous in nature.181 This reasoning was used to
protect a website that named itself “SOS victims of Credit Agricole” on
the grounds that the use was not outrageous in nature.182 But defining
what is outrageous is clearly a matter that is deeply loaded with
subjectivity.
For example, in another case involving Greenpeace, this time
targeting Areva, a Paris High Court held that the trademark had not
been infringed but was disparaged, exceeding the protection of
freedom of expression and holding Greenpeace liable.183 However, this
opinion was reversed at the Court of Cassation, which held that the
parody had to be read in conjunction with Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The court concluded that Greenpeace
was acting in accordance with “the interest of the general public and

179

Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53, at 671.
Id.
181
See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 138.
182
Id. The Supreme Court also reached a similar conclusion involving a use of a
puppet in a television show, which represented the president of the Peugeot car brand
who was disparaging products of the company. In that case, the Supreme Court
reversed lower court rulings that found that the outrageous nature of the speech
caused damage to the company. Id.
183
See Baud, supra note 166, at 31. In that case, the “A” of the company had been
modified with a skull-like shadow, and the body of a dead fish with the statement,
“Stop Plutonium — the Stopping is Obvious.” Here the court found that other means
to communicate the same message could have been used — “the equation
AREVA=DEATH proceeds from a purely disparaging reasoning for which their
authors should be liable,” it concluded. There was a risk that consumers would
believe that all of Areva’s products were harmful, the court explained, and enjoined
the expression as a result. Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 322 (quoting case).
180
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public health, and using proportionate means in so doing, and had
therefore not misused their right to freedom of expression.”184
Nevertheless, while most of these cases do eventually come out in
favor of the defendants, it is worth noting that disparagement can still
be at issue if the defendant targets specific products or services.185 And
it is also worth noting the added role that defamation may play in such
cases.186 This cause of action has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to not include criticism of products or services, suggesting that
it can apply as an alternative in cases where disparagement does not
apply and a company (rather than its specific products or services) is
targeted instead.187 The availability has led some to suggest that it may
be a fruitful alternative for plaintiff corporations to pursue to curb
antibranding expression.
3.

Gaming the Antibrand: TATA and the Turtles

Antibranding is also alive in India, whereupon Greenpeace has also
faced one of its own court cases involving the creation of an online
game called Turtles v. TATA, in which the goal of the game, modeled
after Pac Man, is to help yellow turtles eat as many little white dots as
possible, without running into “Ratty” who appears to be modeled
after Ratan Tata, chair of the powerful multinational Tata Corporation.
The game is designed so that TATA is the antagonist, and the turtle
has to, literally, strategically destroy the TATA logo.188 The purpose of
the game was to draw attention to the potential environmental impact
of a proposed TATA dam, known as the Dhamra Project, and the risk
184
France: Greenpeace France et al. v. Areva, ARTICLE 19 (Feb. 7, 2008), http://
www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3186/en/france:-greenpeace-france-et-al.-v.areva#sthash.s6ndx7L9.dpuf.
185
For example, in a case involving the boycott of Danone’s website, the
expression was protected because the website did not offer products or services, nor
did it target Danone’s products and services specifically. This case, and others,
suggests that targeting products or services, or offering alternative products or
services, might risk liability. See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 138.
186
The 1881 law of defamation charges that defamation occurs “where an
allegation or an assessment of a precise fact is made targeting a specific person so as to
harm his or her honour or reputation.” Id. at 139.
187
Id.
188
“The aim of the colourful and noisy game is to help the yellow turtles to eat as
many of the white dots [jellyfish and other sea creatures] . . . while dodging the TATA
demons if you eat a power pill, you will be gifted with super-turtle powers to vanquish
the demons of development that are threatening your coastal home.” Tata Sons Ltd. v.
Greenpeace Int’l & ANR, (2010) 9089 I.A. 1, ¶¶ 7, 26 (Delhi H.C., 2011) (India)
[hereinafter Tata Sons, (2010) 9089 I.A.], available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/
562656/. Others to avoid are “matty,” “Natty,” or “Tinku.” Id.
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of affecting a turtle habitat, the Olive Ridley Sea Turtle nesting
beaches, among other environmental concerns.189
As I suggested in the previous section, trademark claims often
appear alongside other, speech-related claims like defamation and
disparagement. Here, Tata sued for defamation and trademark
infringement, arguing, in a colorful filing before the court, that
“portraying [Tata] as a demon in the game with pointed use of the ‘T’
device is malicious, as it is intended to convey to the world at large the
so called heartlessness in setting up the Dhamra Project.”190 For
support, Tata argued that “‘use’ of trademark is not confined merely to
the defendant engaging itself in a trade or commercial activity, but
other forms of speech or representation, which would tarnish the
plaintiff’s mark,” citing the 1972 Gemini Rising case (the case
involving a poster that said “Enjoy Cocaine”) and a Louis Vuitton case
from 2007 involving Haute Diggity Dog, a pet toy manufacturer.
Greenpeace, as well, used its own form of comparative law — it
argued that Tata’s actions demonstrated a form of a “strategic lawsuit
against public participation” otherwise known as a SLAPP suit, that
was intended to censor and intimidate those who are concerned with
the environmental impact of the project.191 Greenpeace argued that its
189

Id. ¶¶ 17-19.
“Had the intention of the defendant really been to express dissent, and if indeed
they wanted to speak in hyperboles there was other legitimate means of doing so,” the
filing stated. Id. ¶ 11.
191
For more on SLAPP suits, see, for example, Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) Address, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 39 (1989)
(noting that SLAPP lawsuits are harmful to activists regardless of whether the plaintiff
wins or loses); Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New
Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105 (1988) (suggesting reform to prevent potential
users of intimidation tactics from employing them); Penelope Canan & George W.
Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for
Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 955 (1992) (illustrating
statistically the success of SLAPP plaintiffs); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring,
Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and
Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385 (1988) (using qualitative and
quantitative data to measure the impact the SLAPP experience on subsequent political
participation); Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse
of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417 (1991)
(finding that enthusiasm for the SLAPPback strategy must be tempered by a
recognition of its risks); Sharlene A. McEvoy, “The Big Chill”: Business Use of the Tort
of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 503 (1990) (arguing that there must be a balance between the right to bring an
action for defamation, and the right to exercise one’s first amendment rights); Jawn
Ardin Sandifer & George Bundy Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New Threat to
Civil Rights Organizations, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 559 (1975) (finding that private causes of
action are a threat to boycotts led by civil rights organizations); Victor J. Cosentino,
190
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work was entirely noncommercial, and that Indian trademark law,
specifically section 29(4) of the Indian Trademarks Act of 1999
demonstrates that the use of a trademark for the purposes of criticism,
fair comment, or parody does not amount to infringement.192 It
alleged, similarly, that its use was not in the course of trade and
therefore could not satisfy the requirements for dilution.193
News reports initially suggested that the Delhi High Court advised
Greenpeace to remove the TATA logo from its game (noting that one
Judge was said to have stated to Greenpeace “[w]e are not directing
you to stop using the game but you can consider not using the
logo”).194 However, in its written opinion, the Court advocated a
strong defense of free speech, citing both the Esso case and the Laugh
it Off case.195 What is especially interesting about the case is that it
focuses not just on trademark infringement, and also dilution, but on
defamation, switching between these concerns throughout the
opinion. It dismisses Greenpeace’s use of the term “demons” in
conjunction with the TATA logo as “mere hyperbole,” noting that
Greenpeace argued that the game “succinctly and creatively enables
the registering of protest . . .” and thus must be viewed as part and
parcel of criticism and commentary.196
In the TATA case, the Court quotes extensively from a series of
British opinions that suggested reluctance in granting preliminary
injunctions due to the speech issues involved.197 The Delhi High Court
Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions,
27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 427-29 (1991) (arguing that although plaintiffs in SLAPP
cases have legitimate grievances, the disputes should be left to the political forum).
192
Tata Sons, (2010) 9089 I.A. ¶ 20.
193
“The game in question is merely depicting the challenges that Olive Ridley
turtles would have overcome in order to survive in spite of the Project,” it explained.
Id.
194
Sumathi Chandrashekaran, Greenpeace ‘Advised’ to Remove TATA Logo From
Game, SPICY IP (July 28, 2010, 2:55 PM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/
07/spicyip-tidbit-greenpeace-advised-to.html. For more reports of the case, including
reactions after the ruling, see also Rebecca Abraham, Tata and the Turtles: How
Environmental Activism Triggered a Complex Trademark Dispute, GREENPEACE (Apr. 13,
2011), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/news/Feature-Stories/Tata-andthe-turtles-How-environmental-activism-triggered-a-complex-trademark-dispute/
(reposting from the India Business Law Journal March 2011 issue).
195
Tata Sons, (2010) 9089 I.A. ¶ 24.
196
Id. ¶ 21.
197
It cited an 1891 case involving a preliminary injunction, which the court denied
to grant in a libel case because the court decided to test the allegations of defamation
at trial. “Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at
all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong
reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of
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also questioned whether the role of the Internet called for a more
relaxed standard, given the ease and speed of communication. It also
continued to rely on American jurisprudence in finding the absence of
actual malice, noting that there was no evidence, here, of a reckless
disregard for the truth, and the Internet context did not change its
outcome. Instead, here, the Court noted that the issue involved a
project with a tremendous degree of environmental concern and a
wide diversity of opinions.198
Finally, the Court also rejected the trademark infringement and
dilution claims. Given the absence of a profit motive on behalf of
Greenpeace, and the Court’s recognition of the right of defendants to
“comment, ridicule and parody” the registered trademarks, the Court
refused to grant an injunction.199 In its closing paragraphs, the Court
drew heavily and admiringly from the Laugh it Off opinion, citing
Judge Sachs’ observation that the Court’s focus on the detriment
requirement tended to obscure a larger, and deeper focus on the value
of parody, thus allowing a focus on property to overshadow a more
substantial focus on the value and freedom of expression.200
The Delhi High Court also noted that at times, a parody can actually
enhance the distinctiveness of a famous mark by making it into an
icon.201 Citing the Esso case, the Court concluded: “[T]he use of a
trademark, as the object of a critical comment, or event attack, does
not necessarily result in infringement . . . . If the user’s intention is to
focus on some activity of the trademark owner, and is ‘denominative,’
drawing attention of the reader or viewer to the activity,” it may not be
subject to injunctive relief.202
In a particularly memorable set of observations, the Court wrote,
that it “cannot anoint itself as a literary critic, to judge the efficacy of
use of such medium, nor can it don the robes of a censor. It merely
patrols the boundaries of free speech, and in exceptional cases, issues
injunctions . . . .”203 It continued, “granting an injunction would freeze
interim injunctions,” the case said. Id. ¶ 22.
198
See id. ¶ 35 (citing Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000)
(comparing Greenpeace’s work to a statement made by a guest on the Oprah Winfrey
show regarding the safety of American beef, where the court dismissed the defamation
claim, holding that “exaggeration does not equal defamation”)).
199
Id. ¶ 40.
200
Id. ¶ 74.
201
The court drew on the example of the Hormel case’s use of the character Sp’am,
which noted that the parody “tend[ed] to increase public identification of the famous
mark with its source.” Id. ¶ 30.
202
Id. ¶ 42.
203
Id.
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the entire public debate on the effect of the port project on the Olive
Ridley turtles habitat. That, plainly would not be in public interest; it
would most certainly be contrary to established principles.” The Court
recalled the words of Walter Lippman: “The theory of the free press is
not that the truth will be presented completely or perfectly in any one
instance, but that the truth will emerge from free discussion.”204
C. Three Key Themes: Fundamental Rights, Commodity and
Commerciality
All of the major cases discussed thus far have all reached
conclusions that are strongly protective of the antibrand, but with very
different rationales. Plesner’s case, for example, relied almost
exclusively on human rights reasoning, whereas the Laugh it Off case
was resolved on trademark grounds (and a finding of an absence of
actual damages). On the other hand, both the Esso and TATA cases
were resolved on the grounds that the uses were noncommercial and
therefore fell out of the realm of trademark law. Whatever the result,
each case, I think suggests some areas that are ripe for further
consideration, particularly given the global nature of each dispute.
Consider three main areas of tension, illustrated by the cases
discussed above. The first major theme involves the fundamental
question of which right matters more: the right to freedom of speech,
and relatedly, the right to parody, or the right to intellectual property.
Underlying this question, I would suggest, is an architectural question
about how to situate the protection of intellectual property alongside
the creation and protection of other fundamental rights.205 Is
intellectual property a fundamental right, akin to other fundamental
rights, or should it be treated as secondary to these other rights? And
if intellectual property is considered to be a fundamental right, then
how does that right square with that of the right to freedom of speech?
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states in
Article 17 section 2 that “Intellectual property shall be protected,” and
further that it “stands as an end in itself.”206 However, if the world is
moving towards a more unitary regime for trademark registrations, it
becomes necessary to confront the diversity of speech protections
204

Id. ¶ 43.
See also Geiger, “Constitutionalising,” supra note 133, at 371; Helfer, Regime
Shifting, supra note 21, at 45-51; Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 971, 994 (2007) [hereinafter
Human Rights Framework]; Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests
in a Human Rights Framework, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1038, 1041-47 (2007).
206
Geiger, “Constitutionalising,” supra note 133, at 376.
205

928

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:875

within other nation states. Some countries, like the United States,
expressly protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, and
other commonwealth countries, like the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Australia, do not have a constitutional right to freedom
of speech, but recognize its existence in statutes or common law.207
Robert Burrell and Dev Gangjee have pointed out that the concept of
freedom of expression in the United States, with its attendant
suspicion of government, may make transplanting its legal principles
quite difficult in jurisdictions which have different approaches to
freedom of speech.208 Speech is much more protected in the United
States than in other jurisdictions like Germany, France, and South
Africa, which explains in part why the commercial or noncommercial
nature of the speech became so significant. There is also some
suggestion that commercial courts are ill-equipped to address
constitutional matters, given the complexity of constitutional matters
and the difficulty of transplanting legal concepts. There is also another
excellent point raised by Gangjee and Burrell: a debate about
constitutional rights, framed by a conflict between property and
speech, just gets us nowhere because there is no “trumping” quality of
either one.209
Then there is also the question of how to employ human rights
principles in such disputes. Recall that the case involving Plesner, for
example, and also others discussed, to a lesser extent, were resolved
not on trademark grounds — but on human rights principles. In
Germany, too, in one case, the defendant altered the Marlboro
trademark to deliver a nonsmoking message; the court cited the basic
human right of freedom of expression in protecting the work.210 This
factor suggests yet another layer of complexity to trademark
cosmopolitanism, because characterizing intellectual property as a
fundamental right does not necessarily garner its primacy against
other rights, like freedom of expression worldwide. Some have argued
that human rights law operates as a “corrective” when intellectual
property rights might be used “excessively” or “contrary to their
functions” — and that these protections operate when other “safety
valves” in intellectual property have failed, such as fair use, fair
dealing, and other exceptions and limitations.211 But, at the same time,
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there is growing evidence that the protection of intellectual property,
itself, is now viewed as a human right — in one case before the
European Court of Human Rights, involving the mark “Budweiser,”
the Court decided to classify trademarks as a type of “property right”
for the purpose of human rights analysis.212 As a result, it makes it
difficult to see how relying on fundamental rights analysis assists in
resolving tough cases.
Some scholars have argued, on this point, that thinking about
intellectual property as a fundamental right ensures that it receives an
important place in the relevant national constitution, ensuring that it
ranks highly in any rights hierarchy. It also makes further justification
of intellectual property unnecessary since it is viewed as a
fundamental right. Finally, as Christopher Geiger has suggested, if
intellectual property is considered to be a fundamental right, it
becomes linked to “ethical values,” which are often considered to
enjoy “widespread consent and acknowledgment under international
law.”213
Yet classifying intellectual property as a fundamental right gives us
very little insight as to how to balance such a right against other
fundamental rights, like freedom of speech.214 Particularly in countries
where there is no fundamental right to freedom of speech, the very act
of classifying intellectual property in this manner raises the risk of
further alienating speech interests in favor of the primacy of
intellectual property.215 Further, as Lawrence Helfer has explained, if
intellectual property owners choose to invoke human rights law in
order to garner additional protections, they would be likely to face stiff
resistance from users and consumers, who would, in turn draw upon
other fundamental rights in order to articulate a competing vision that
focuses on the need to restrict, rather than expand, intellectual
212
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property rights in order to protect fundamental freedoms.216 So, for
example, national courts in Europe have been using the right to
freedom of expression, protected by the European Convention,
towards this end, particularly in the area of copyright to protect the
creation of exceptions to the law.217
Another main theme involves the question of whether these disputes
concerning antibranding are best explored through the lens of the
classic division between speech and property, or whether it makes
sense to turn to other areas of law, such as the internal architecture of
trademark law, to resolve these disputes.218 And, as a related matter,
how much should claims like defamation and disparagement be
employed as part of the dispute? Is there a benefit to not looking
solely to fundamental rights to address parody, but instead by crafting
exceptions within trademark law instead? Does only allowing a
defendant recourse to fundamental rights to speech allow the property
right of trademarks to grow even further, without having internal
safety valves in its architecture?
Part of this question, of course, addresses the context of the
protection of parody in other jurisdictions. Constitutionalizing the
right to antibrand, for example, might actually suggest that the right is
comparable to that of an intellectual property right — which is
interesting, given that in the United States fair use is not considered to
be a constitutional right, but rather seems to be characterized as a
privilege.219 The more a jurisdiction protects parody and freedom of
speech, or the more uncertain of the outcome, one might argue, the
more likely it will be that a plaintiff will seek to bring in other areas of
law to restrict the defendant’s speech, like defamation and
disparagement, or moral rights, to defend its intellectual property. As a
result, other areas of law become employed in the service of trademark
law, reflecting areas that trademark law has really failed to
conclusively address. For example, in the United Kingdom, the author
of a parodied work can also bring an action for derogatory treatment
— that it distorted or mutilated the work, or that it was prejudicial to
the intellectual property owner’s honor or reputation.220
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Even in the United Kingdom, where there are no specific mentions
of the right to parody within the statutory language, scholars have
argued that the trademark statute (which protects marks against unfair
advantage or detriment “without due cause”) suggests some possibility
that the term “due cause” might provide some support for parody.221
Others have suggested the use of the “fair dealing” exception to
protect parody in the copyright context.222 (The same is also true in
South Africa, where fair dealing is used instead of “fair use.”)223 And
still other cases have protected parody on the grounds that the
plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion.224
In the context of antibranding, it may not always be necessary to
carve out specific protections for parody if there are other means of
protection available. Often, these other means can come from other
constitutional principles, or even other parts of the trademark
architecture of that jurisdiction. In a German case, for example, the
country’s Supreme Court defended a postcard publisher that produced
a satirical image that alluded to the trademark MILKA (a chocolate
company), and also employed the distinctive lilac color in its
artwork.225 Yet although the Court classified the use as a trademark
use, and also noted that the use of the lilac color did evoke MILKA’s
reputation, it opted to protect the use — not under freedom of
expression or human rights principles per se — but under what has
been described as a “constitutional right of freedom of the arts,” a
specific version of the right to freedom of expression.226 Here, even
though it recognized that the defendant was referencing the plaintiff’s
reputation, it chose to honor the principle of artistic freedom over
intellectual property rights, noting
if the postcard (the media of the parody) does not debase the
claimant’s trade mark and if it is not proved that the defendant
acted exclusively for a commercial purpose, the protection of
221
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artistic freedom has to prevail in the present litigation over the
protection of property rights of Article 14(1) of the German
Basic Law.227
An additional area of dispute, stemming from this last point,
involves the question of whether the antibrand should be treated
differently than a brand. Often antibrands can be sold, as well as
circulated, raising questions of what to do when there are expressive
as well as commercial interests present. Not dissimilarly to the United
States, it appears that parody is protected so long as it does not
conflict with the commercial interests of the plaintiff — so long as the
mark is being used for critique or parody.228 Of course, there are costs
with an approach that focuses solely on trademark use, since it is not
always entirely clear what a use “in the course of trade” can
comprise.229 Yet scholars have expressed fear that the line between
commercial and noncommercial expression (parody and the like)
becomes extraordinarily blurred, given the expansion of trademark
rights as property rights, a risk that only becomes exacerbated by
recent rulings by the European Court of Justice.230
But there are also a number of cases that involve, like the South
African case above, the sale of goods that represent parodies or
antibrands. Here, despite the South African outcome, the case law is
decidedly more mixed internationally, especially in the United States,
where case law has lined up on either side. The same is true
internationally, where the case law is also split. For example, despite
the Laugh it Off outcome, a German court had issued an injunction
against the sale of shirts that had the Shell logo with a skull, finding
that the use was commercial and therefore fell within the Unfair
Competition Act.231 At times in trademark-related cases, courts have
even attributed commercial motivations to media that has traditionally
received the highest level of constitutional protections — like
newspapers and other forms of editorial media. In one such case from
the United Kingdom, a court even interpreted “use in the course of
trade” to include a magazine’s use of the logo of Philips Company that
227
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substituted the logo’s stars with Nazi swastikas to draw attention to a
story it was publishing on the company’s activities during the Second
World War.232 The use was considered to be commercial in the sense
that it was intended to increase sales of the magazine, but the risks to
the concept of freedom of expression were obvious.
There are, however, a number of options to address the absence of
clear protections for parody. States can easily specifically exempt
noncommercial expression and political speech, and interpret parody
as falling within these parameters.233 Or states can choose to refrain
from enacting strong dilution laws.234 Still another option is for courts
in member states to decline to award injunctive relief, as we saw in the
Tata case, opting instead to focus on damages in order to preserve the
interest in freedom of speech, or require the use of disclaimers to
obviate confusion.235 A final option, also stemming from Tata, could
be for member states to enact SLAPP-like statutes, or fee-shifting
provisions that would force overly aggressive trademark owners to
reconsider filing suit in non-meritorious cases.
A final suggestion could be a broad one. Member states could amend
the Paris Convention or TRIPS to state a direct commitment to
“freedom of expression” when implementing their trademark
protections. Although the obligation to protect freedom of expression
is already part of the international treaty world, and certainly relevant
to the interpretation of treaty terms, a more specific declaration for
freedom of speech might be vital to ensuring a greater balance.236
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have suggested a link between contemporary
accounts of cosmopolitanism and the growing case law on both global
branding and antibranding. As I have suggested, the world of global
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trademarks can be characterized in terms of a major shift from
national to global branding strategies.
Many cosmopolitanist ideals, I have suggested, have taken root in a
variety of different political, economic, and social contexts, including
intellectual property regulation and the international trademark
system. In the trademark context, I would argue each of these areas
have a variety of different facets, some that are more culturally
oriented, and focused on the emergence of global brands and an
accompanying transnational culture of consumption; and others more
doctrinally or institutionally oriented that center on designing a legal
architecture that focuses towards harmonization.
At the same time, trademark lawyers often extol the virtues of
harmonization and globalization without grappling with its complex
dynamics as applied to the localized interpretation and expression of
intellectual property protections. We see this particularly in the
growing set of case law regarding the conflicts between the
transnational brand, activist movements, and freedom of speech. As I
have suggested, the dyadic relationship between the global branding
— and antibranding movements — has exposed both the idealism and
the fragility of cosmopolitanist ideals, offering us significant
challenges for the future.

